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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines whether the Western-driven model of recruitment to, and
consequences of, high-risk activism that McAdam introduced before the internet applies
to non-violent anti-regime campaigns in autocratic contexts after the social media
revolution. I use the case of the 18-day non-violent Egyptian uprising of 2011 to
investigate these topics. I specifically utilize data from the Arab Democracy Barometer
survey and other micro- and macro-level sources. I find that face-to-face ties are most
effective in recruitment to such movements. Online networks create new forms of dissent,
such as online activism. Moreover, online ties are especially useful in mobilizing women.
I also uncover that transitional periods that follow such campaigns increase political
participation but might decrease support for democracy. My results stress the importance
of social media to the recruitment process in autocratic gender-restrictive contexts and
add to our understanding of the transitional periods.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Differential recruitment is one of the most fascinating topics in the field of social
movements. Understanding why some people take it upon themselves to participate in
street action, while most others choose not to, has been the topic of many research
projects. Most studies concentrate on recruitment to relatively low-risk forms of activism.
However, starting in the 1980s, there has been an increased interest in studying high-risk
activism. These are social movement activities that could cause harm to participants. This
could be physical, legal, or even psychological damage (McAdam 1986). The most
intriguing question is, why do some supporters of a particular cause choose to engage in
activities where they could be injured, captured and tortured, or even killed while most
backers of the same issue choose to do nothing?
In this dissertation, I investigate non-violent high-risk anti-regime campaigns in
authoritarian contexts, after the introduction of social media. I do so by applying
McAdam’s Western-driven model of recruitment to high-risk campaigns to the case of
the non-violent Egyptian uprising of 2011.1 I write my dissertation in a “three-paper”
format. Thus, I write each of the three empirical chapters as a stand-alone paper that I
plan to publish as a peer-reviewed journal article. In doing so, I aim to add to the
literature in three ways. First, I test whether the factors that affect recruitment to high-risk

Some might argue that the Egyptian uprising was not entirely “non-violent.” There were
many altercations in the streets where protestors threw stones at security forces,
vandalized buildings, or engaged in other unruly acts. Because of that, some scholars
might think of the Egyptian uprising as an example of “unarmed collective violence.”
This expression, introduced by Kadivar and Ketchley (2018), refers to a movement that
does not use firearms or explosives but might engage in action that causes physical
damage to people or property. However, other scholars (Cheneweth & Stephan 2011)
consider the uprising to be a non-violent campaign. I will use the term “non-violent
campaign” to refer to the uprising in this dissertation.
1
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movements in Western democracies such as the United States would be similar to those
that affect recruitment to high-risk non-violent campaigns in autocratic contexts such as
Egypt. Second, I test whether the introduction of social media affected the relationship
between face-to-face networks and recruitment to such movements. Third, I look at the
biographical consequences of activism in a slightly different fashion. Because an uprising
affects the entire country and not just the dissidents, instead of studying the biographical
consequences of activism, I investigate how transitional periods that follow a regime
change affect political participation and opinions of citizens in general. I then take into
consideration the actors’ activist status and gender.
In the remainder of this chapter, I introduce my research questions. I then include
a brief description of the Egyptian uprising and its appropriateness as a case study. Next,
I offer a brief overview of McAdam’s model of recruitment to high-risk campaigns. I
then discuss the data that I used in this dissertation. Finally, I provide a brief description
of each of my three empirical chapters.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This dissertation is an attempt to answer one main research question: does the
Western-driven model of recruitment to, and consequences of, high-risk activism that
McAdam (1986) introduced before the internet apply to non-violent anti-regime
campaigns in autocratic contexts after the social media revolution? To answer this
question, I write three distinct chapters. Each chapter attempts to answer one specific
research question. My research question for chapter two is: what are the determinants of
protest participation in non-violent high-risk anti-regime campaigns in authoritarian
contexts in the era of social media? In my third chapter, my research question is: what is
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the relationship between online political networks and participation in non-violent highrisk anti-regime campaigns in autocratic gender-restrictive environments? In chapter four,
I answer the following research question: how do transitional periods that follow initially
successful non-violent anti-autocratic-regime campaigns that fail to transition to
democracy affect political participation and opinion among citizens?
To answer my questions, I use the case of the Egyptian uprising of January 25,
2011. The 18-day non-violent campaign was a high-risk anti-regime movement that
resulted in the ousting of Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak, a military dictator who
has been ruling Egypt for almost thirty years at the time. I utilize data from four
individual-level data sources and a macro-level database. My individual-level data come
from the Second, Third, and Fourth waves of the Arab Democracy Barometer survey. I
also employ the World Value Survey, Fifth Wave. In addition, I utilize a macro-level
collection of incidents of social conflict that occurred between 2005 and 2016 in Egypt.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To answer my research questions, I build on three existing social movement
bodies of literature. I use insights from McAdam’s model of recruitment to high-risk
activism (McAdam1986; McAdam1988; McAdam 1989; Wiltfang & McAdam 1991;
McAdam 1992; Nepstad & Smith 1999; Nepstad 2004). This body of literature separates
high-risk movements from other types of political dissent. McAdam proposed his model
in his groundbreaking study of recruitment to the high-risk Freedom Summer campaign,
which aimed at registering voters in Mississippi in 1964 (McAdam1986; McAdam1988;
McAdam 1989; McAdam 1992). The campaign recruited students from American
universities. There were a few steps that participants took before they reached
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Mississippi. The first step was to apply to the campaign. The organizers then interviewed
prospective participants. Of those who were accepted, some made it to Mississippi, and
others did not. McAdam investigated how participants were different from “withdrawals”
who applied, were accepted, but did not join the campaign.
In McAdam’s model, both participants and withdrawals were “highly committed,
articulate supporters of the goals and values of the summer campaign” (McAdam 1986:
73). The two main factors that affected mobilization to the campaign, however, were
networks and biographical availability. McAdam (1986) found that networks were robust
determinants of whether a person joined the campaign. Participants were more likely than
withdrawals to have strong personal ties to other activists who joined the high-risk
campaign and weak or no ties to withdrawals. McAdam stated that it made sense that a
person who had a close friend who joined a high-risk activity where s/he could have been
exposed to great harm would be motivated to join that same activity. Also, membership
in political organizations was important for mobilization. Applicants who were members
of a higher number of organizations that supported the campaign’s general cause were
more likely to make it to Mississippi (McAdam 1986).
McAdam also found that biographical availability mattered. This simply means
that those who were more able to participate in high-risk activities were more likely to do
so. For instance, men were more likely to engage in high-risk activities than women
because they had fewer restrictions on their movements. It was also more socially
acceptable for men to be engaged in risky behavior, whereas it was seen as unnecessary
for women. In addition, individuals who were young, unemployed, single, college
students, or childless had more time that they could have devoted to high-risk activism
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than other individuals.
Additionally, McAdam found that participating in high-risk activism affected both
the political and personal lives of activists. He called this phenomenon the biographical
consequences of activism. McAdam found that participants in the Freedom Summer
campaign were different from the no-shows in many ways. For instance, they were more
likely to continue to be politically active. They were also different than non-activists in
their career choices. Moreover, they were more likely than non-activists to have a lower
income and to be divorced. These effects were different for women and men.
McAdam’s model, and most subsequent studies of high-risk activism, deal with
movements in Western democracies. Moreover, almost all of these studies address
movements that occurred before the social media revolution of the mid-2000s (McAdam
1986; Wiltfang & McAdam 1991; Nepstad & Smith 1999; Nepstad 2004). We do not
know if this model would apply to different types of high-risk campaigns, such as nonviolent anti-regime movements in autocratic societies. We also do not know if the
introduction of social media that changed the way we network with others in our daily
lives would change the relationship between face-to-face networks and recruitment to
high-risk movements. I utilize knowledge gained from research on the effect of the
internet on social movements processes (Earl & Kimport 2008; Earl et al. 2010; Earl &
Kimport 2010; Earl & Kimport 2011; Earl et al. 2013) to determine whether online
networks could affect this well-established relationship.
There has been a debate about the effect of the internet on social movement
processes. According to Earl et al. (2010), some scholars such as Tarrow (1998), Diani
(2000), Pudrovska and Ferree (2004), and Tilly (2004) believe that the internet has no
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major effect on social movement processes. On the other hand, Earl and her co-authors,
among others, argue that the internet could have one of two effects on social movement
processes. They could have a “super-size effect,” which refers to a situation where the
social movement processes stay the same, but they become more extensive in magnitude.
For instance, instead of distributing flyers about an upcoming protest event in community
areas where few hundred people could see them, the internet could allow hundreds of
thousands of potential recruits to see the flyers in a few minutes or hours. The other
possible effect of the internet is that it could change the processes themselves, creating
the need for a “theory 2.0.” For example, the internet could create new forms of activism
and new types of activists that could not be explained using the existing social movement
theories (Earl & Kimport 2010). I speak to this debate by examining the effect of social
media on recruitment to non-violent anti-regime high-risk movements in autocratic
gender-restrictive environments.
The other body of literature this dissertation speaks to is related to the transitional
periods (Barrie & Ketchley 2018; Kadivar 2018; Kadivar & Ketchley 2018; Ketchley &
El-Rayyes 2019; Pinckney 2020 (forthcoming)). This relatively new field combines
insights from the literature on non-violent resistance and democratization (Pinckney 2020
(forthcoming)). The main focus of transitologists is to understand the factors that lead to
a successful transition to democracy after an initial democratic breakthrough. They
mostly utilize macro-level data to study the effect of protest, violent action, or
institutionalization on the successful transition to democracy. Transitologists do not
usually consider the effect of this chaotic period on people’s political participation and
attitudes. They do not necessarily address the possibility that citizens might enter a

7
transitional period with certain attitudes towards democracy and change these attitudes
because of their experiences during that chaotic period. They also do not consider that
political participation might change during that period due to the level of chaos and threat
that the country faces.
I contribute to the literature on social movements in many ways. First, I add to our
knowledge of recruitment to high-risk activism and the on-going conversation about the
role of the internet in mobilization. I do so by a) applying McAdam’s model of
recruitment to high-risk movements in Western democracies to non-violent anti-regime
campaigns in authoritarian contexts; b) distinguishing between three forms of activism
that include online activism only, street-protest only, or both; and c) testing the gendered
effect of the internet as a recruitment tool. Second, I add to our understanding of the
consequences of high-risk non-violent campaigns and our knowledge of transitional
periods by tracking political participation throughout an eight-year period that started
three years before an initially successful non-violent campaign and ended with a failed
transition to democracy, five years after the ousting of a military dictator.
THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING
The Egyptian uprising was an 18-day non-violent campaign that started on
January 25, 2011. Of course, there was a “cocktail of major factors that, when combined,
created the social explosion” that was the Egyptian uprising (Salih 2013:186). This
“lethal mix” included a declining economy and rampant government corruption
combined with extreme repression by the regime and its apparatus, in addition to a
complete lack of basic human rights (Salih 2013:186). The adoption of the IMF and
World Bank programs caused the regime to lift subsidies on major essential goods. At the
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same time, the number of government jobs was reduced tremendously. Also, taxes were
increased dramatically for citizens, but not investors. These policies caused the prices of
food and essential items to skyrocket. At the same time, unemployment increased
remarkably. The bulk of Egyptians were living in extreme poverty. In a country where
the majority were twenty-five years or younger, these frustrations were certain to create a
mass uprising. Human rights violations were also a major factor. Mubarak’s regime used
the war on terror as a way to justify “abduction, involuntary disappearances, unwarranted
arrest, torture and unfair trials, and even unlawful killings” of political opponents.
Moreover, he was planning on proclaiming his son as his successor (Salih 2013: 187).
Many observers, however, view three proximate factors as central to igniting the
mass movement (El-Ghobashy 2011; Rushdy 2012). First, non-governmental
organizations started to introduce to Egyptians the idea of peaceful anti-government
protests. For instance, the Kefaya (Arabic for enough) Movement that held its first silentprotest event in December 2004 and was officially established in 2005 was viewed as an
“unusual spectacle” (Clarke 2011: 397) at first. The movement called for Mubarak to step
down at a time when no one even dreamed of attacking Mubarak. During that time, it was
possible to attack individual ministers or institutions, but never Mubarak. However,
Kefaya was able to break this barrier, bring together a coalition of oppositional forces,
and normalize protests against Mubarak (Clarke 2011). A few years later, in 2008, the
April 6 Youth Movement was formed during a series of labor strikes. In 2010, one year
before the uprising, April 6 Movement called for protests against police brutality on
January 25, 2010, but few people showed up for the protests (Singerman 2013). These
organizations, and the political activities they generated, caused at least some in the
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population to become more accepting of protest as a viable tactic for social change. Small
anti-government protests started to appear throughout the country before the uprising in
response to a constellation of national and international issues, solidifying this view. For
instance, there were protests over the support of the Egyptian regime for the 2003
American invasion of Iraq as well as the on-going state torture of political opponents
(Rushdy 2012).
Second, the Tunisian revolution began on December 18, 2010, and ended
with the ousting of the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14,
2011. This triumph made the possibility of overthrowing Mubarak apparent to
Egyptians (El-Ghobashy 2011). Third, the June 6, 2010 murder of the 28-year-old
Alexandria man, Khaled Said, at the hands of the corrupt local police created a
strong reaction among Egyptians (Ghonim 2012). While such incidents were a
regular occurrence in Egypt, Said’s case was unique in that a photo of Said’s face
both before and after the attack made its way to social media forums such as
Facebook. The photo created a strong backlash among middle-class Egyptians
because Said looked like them. He was a regular middle-class good-looking man.
They felt that if it happened to him, it could happen to them too. After seeing the
photos, Google executive Wael Ghonim created a memorial Facebook page
labeled “We Are All Khaled Said” that attracted hundreds of thousands of
followers. The Facebook page eventually called for a demonstration on January
25 to protest police repression and human rights violations (Rushdy 2012; ElBendary 2013). Note that this is the day that the uprising began.
In Cairo, the protest started in Tahrir Square, Arabic for “Liberation”
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Square (El-Bendary 2013).2 Similar protests took place in squares across Egypt, most
notably in the cities of Suez, Alexandria, and Port Said. The movement began with a
series of protests targeting police brutality. The protestors soon adopted demands for
democracy and social justice as represented by the key slogans “‘aish, hurriyya, karama
insaniyya,” Arabic for bread, freedom, and human dignity (Teti & Gervasio 2011: 323).
Activists estimated crowds at the very onset to be in the millions, and participation in the
uprising likely increased throughout the 18-day event. During that period, Mubarak made
a variety of concession speeches, but at other times, riot police violently attacked
demonstrators. Despite these actions, protestors still turned out, chanting for regime
change. Mubarak stepped down on February 11. He likely did this because of the
overwhelming popular support for the uprising, as evident by the hundreds of thousands
of people who refused to end their demonstrations until he resigned (Holmes 2012), as
well as the fact that the military eventually sided with the insurgency (Nepstad 2011).
Protestors were operating in a high-risk situation because the state and its
apparatus subjected them to extreme repressive actions. During the first day of the
uprising, for instance, the police used teargas and water cannons against demonstrators.
On the ninth day of the uprising, known as the Battle of the Camel day, hired supporters
of the regime rode into protest crowds on horses and camels, attacking them with swords.
In other instances, the police fired live ammunition into insurgents and drove police tanks
into crowds of demonstrators. Throughout this entire time, agents working with the

2

In Appendix D, I provide a more detailed account of some of the major incidents that
took place in each of the 18-day uprising based on information from Idle & Nunns
(2011); Ghonim (2012); Rushdy (2012); El-Bendary (2013); Faris (2013); and Masoud
(2014).
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minister of interior kidnapped, raped, and tortured dissenters (Ghonim 2012;
Naber & Said 2016). Because of these extreme repressive measures, about 846
protestors died, 6,467 sustained injuries, and an unknown number of insurgents
disappeared during the non-violent campaign (Mungin 2011).
Who were the protestors? Some scholars claim that it was a middle-class
uprising (Ghonim 2012; Holmes 2012; Rushdy 2012; Herrera 2014; Masoud
2014). The assumption is that many of the people who participated – at least at the
onset of the uprising – were upper-middle-class, highly educated, professionals,
or college students (Masoud 2014). Many of them were social media users (Brym
et al. 2014). Holmes (2012) argues that subsequent participants were of lower
socioeconomic backgrounds. Activists wanted to overthrow Mubarak. However,
middle-class dissenters wanted other more “Westernized” goals as well (Trager
2011). These goals included the reformation of Egypt into a socially liberal,
democratic, and pro-human rights society. Holmes (2012) speculates that
participants of lower socioeconomic status adopted these human rights goals at
later stages of the uprising. Despite the strong Westernized element to the
uprising, there was always a noticeable presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and
other factions of political Islam. Those latter protestors articulated a decidedly
non-Westernized vision of a state dominated by conservative Muslim ideals
(Nawara 2013; Masoud 2014).
After Mubarak stepped down, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
ruled the country for about a year and a half while Egyptians were preparing for the first
democratic elections after the uprising. SCAF is the leadership body of the Egyptian
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military. During this transitional period, in June of 2012, Mohamed Morsi Issa Al-Ayyat
was democratically elected as President. Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom
and Justice Party tried to push Egypt into a more conservative direction by changing
education curriculum to be more in agreement with conservative Islamic principles,
placing greater restriction on the rights of women, and writing a constitution more in-line
with Sharia law (laws driven from the Islamic religious tradition) (Nawara 2013).
Massive waves of people protested in reaction to these developments, especially in May
and June of 2013. The central goal was to oust President Morsi so that the uprising could
achieve its fundamental goals of “bread, freedom, and human dignity.” Given the
Westernized middle-class nature of the uprising, it is not surprising that many people
would have rebelled against the rise of Morsi. The Egyptian military, under the command
of Chief-of-Staff Abdel Fattah Saeed Hussein Khalil el-Sisi, captured and imprisoned
Morsi on July 3, 2013. On May 28, 2014, el-Sisi was elected as the new President of
Egypt. Many Egyptians boycotted the election in protest, however, and el-Sisi faced no
strong oppositional candidates. As of the writing of this document, el-Sisi stays in power.
Observers universally agree that the country returned to an autocratic political system of
government with no meaningful democratic processes. Thus, most agree that the uprising
ultimately failed.
WHY THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING?
The Egyptian uprising is a particularly suitable case study for many reasons. First,
not only was the uprising a high-risk movement, but it was also a particular type. It was a
non-violent anti-regime movement that took place in an autocratic society. While some
might believe that it is not possible to apply McAdam’s model to the uprising because it
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is a different type of movement that occurred in a different context, I contend that this is
one of the strengths of my case study. Of course, a non-violent anti-regime campaign in
an autocratic society is different from an attempt to register voters in Mississippi in some
ways. Some might argue that the level of risk was more intense during the Egyptian
uprising because protestors were facing security forces who were willing to kill or injure
them, and who did both. I do not necessarily agree with this assumption because
segregationists killed three volunteers during the first few days of the Freedom Summer
campaign (McAdam 1986). Others point to the fact that the participants of the uprising
were not members of a specific group of citizens, such as college students. All Egyptians
had the opportunity to participate. Besides, the goal of the uprising was to change the
regime, whereas Freedom Summer was not an anti-regime campaign. I argue that these
differences add to the literature by allowing me the opportunity to examine the model in a
very different setting. The common factor between these two movements is that both of
them were high-risk. In both instances, participants knew that there was a chance that
they will be injured, captured and tortured, or killed. Nevertheless, in both cases, activists
chose to join such high-risk movements. I investigate whether recruitment to high-risk
activism is a) different in an authoritarian context, and b) different when the goal is
revolution rather than reform.
Second, the uprising took place after the introduction of social media, which
changed the way that people around the globe network and interact with each other. The
timing of the uprising is vital because it allows me to examine whether this new form of
networking would affect the established relationship between face-to-face networks and
mobilization. It is also an opportunity to evaluate the role of online ties in the
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mobilization process.
Finally, the Egyptian uprising is simply too important to ignore. It was a mass
movement that caught analysts by surprise (Goodwin 2011; Kurzman 2012). The uprising
affected a quarter of the world’s Arab population. Moreover, the Egyptian uprising is a
contemporary movement, and thus, historians and movement scholars are still trying to
unravel key processes that occurred during the 18-day event.
DATA
I use quantitative individual-level data to answer my first and second research
questions. For my third research question, I use micro-level surveys and a macro-level
collection of incidents of social conflict in Egypt between 2005 and 2016. I will include a
brief description of each dataset below. I will provide a more thorough description of
each data set in the appropriate chapter(s). However, I will discuss the strength and
limitations of my individual-level data below.
My four surveys were representative samples of Egyptians. All my data were
collected through face-to-face interviews in Arabic. All four surveys, following standard
surveying procedures in Egypt, excluded the five frontier governorates of Matrouh, North
Sinai, South Sinai, New Valley, and Red Sea for security reasons. My World Value
Survey, Fifth Wave (2008; WVSV), data were collected between March 3, 2008, and
May 4, 2008, in Egypt. The interviews for the Second Wave of the Arab Democracy
Barometer (ABII; 2011) took place from June 17 to June 30, 2011. The collection of the
Arab Democracy Barometer, Third Wave (ABIII; 2013), occurred between March 31 and
April 7, 2013. The Fourth Wave of the Arab Democracy Barometer (ABIV; 2016)
conducted interviews in April of 2016.
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The datasets are uniquely suitable for answering my research questions for many
reasons. The Arab Democracy Barometer, Second Wave, as far as I know, is the only
available and reliable representative sample of Egyptians that was collected at that crucial
historical moment. As a student of social movements in autocratic societies in the Middle
East and North Africa, I appreciate the importance of having a dataset that can further our
understanding of political participation in that region.
Additionally, the timing of the surveys was especially important. The ABII was
administered at the beginning of the Egyptian transitional period. At that time, even
though Egypt was under the control of SCAF, Egyptians enjoyed unprecedented levels of
freedom of speech. Their fear of expressing their political views was relatively low, as
evident by the questions that were asked in the ABII that were not asked in other surveys
that took place before the uprising such as the WVSV. Those same questions were also
not asked in the ABIV, under el-Sisi’s reign. The benefits of these newfound freedoms
are apparent in the low percentages of “I do not know” responses and refusal to answer
questions. It is evident that Egyptians were comfortable enough to express their opinions
by the diversity of their responses. When asked if they were supporting Mubarak, in the
opposition against Mubarak, or belonged to neither-side “during the protests in Egypt
between January 25 and February 11,” only .4 percent reported that they did not know,
and 6.9 percent claimed that they were supporting neither side. About 14.3 percent
claimed that they were supporting Mubarak, and 78.4 percent disclosed that they were in
the opposition. These results show that people were not too afraid to share their political
preferences at the time. The other three surveys were also administered in crucial
historical moments. WVSV took place in 2008, during Mubarak’s time. It allowed a rare
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glimpse into citizens’ political participation and opinion under his authoritarian rule. The
ABIII was distributed towards the end of Morsi’s time in office, but before the Tamarod
Movement began. This timing was essential to the understanding of Egyptians’ opinions
during the era of the Muslim Brotherhood before the possibility of Morsi’s removal was
known. The ABIV took place five years after the uprising, which is a standard point at
which scholars can evaluate the long-term effects of a non-violent movement
(Chenoweth & Stephan 2011).
Finally, the surveys had detailed questions about political participation and
opinions, as well as social media usage. These detailed questions in the ABII, for
example, allowed me to separate different types of political ties such as face-to-face and
online networks. I was also able to separate street-protest from online activism. The
detailed questions about post-uprising political action and opinions were also crucial to
the analysis in my fourth chapter. The chapter also benefited greatly from the repeated
questions, many of them word-for-word, in the three waves of the Arab democracy
barometer. The WVSV also had similar questions.
The surveys have some limitations. For example, all four surveys, like all other
surveys conducted in Egypt, did not collect data from the five border governorates, which
include Matrouh, North Sinai, South Sinai, New Valley, and Red Sea for security
reasons. This procedure excluded less than two percent of the total Egyptian population
(Barssoum 2007; Pew Research Center 2014). These governorates have unique
circumstances because their inhabitants are usually a mix of ethnic indigenous peoples
and recent migrants who are somehow related to the tourism industry or other financial
development projects. For instance, South Sinai was transformed from a “politically
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disputed borderland” to a tourist attraction in the past few decades (Karkabi 2013: 50).
Understanding political participation in the frontier governorates is a fascinating topic,
but it is beyond the scope of this project. One other limitation is that the cross-sectional
nature of the data might cause some concerns about causality claims. Because of that, I
am careful not to make any such assertions without a clearly established temporal order. I
will discuss other limitations of the surveys as they apply to each chapter.
CHAPTERS OVERVIEW
In my second chapter, I apply McAdam’s model to the case of the Egyptian
uprising of 2011. The traditional high-risk recruitment model stresses the importance of
networks and biographical availability to the mobilization process. This model was
developed in Western democracies and before the internet revolution of the Twenty-First
Century. I argue that in autocratic societies, in the era of social media, online political ties
do not replace personal ties as the most effective recruitment tool for high-risk streetprotests. Instead, it creates possibilities for other forms of dissent. I investigate this claim
using the Arab Democracy Barometer survey (2011), a representative sample of
Egyptians administered five months after the 18-day anti-regime uprising of 2011. I find
that, in agreement with the traditional model, face-to-face networks were most influential
in recruitment to street-protests. However, social media mobilized to online activism and,
likely, increased the influence of street-activists.
In chapter three, I examine the gendered effect of social media as a recruitment
tool. Social movements have used social media for recruitment since the mid-2000s.
Scholars agree that Facebook and Twitter especially mobilized people during the 2011
world-wide protest wave. However, the literature largely ignores the gendered effect of
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social media on mobilization. I argue that social media is especially mobilizing for
women in high-risk gender restrictive contexts. In such instances, online ties with fellow
citizens offer women access to information about political issues in their countries, the
opportunity to articulate political views, and a space to interact with activists. I
investigate this claim using the Arab Democracy Barometer survey (2011), a
representative sample of Egyptians administered five months after the 18-day anti-regime
uprising of 2011. I find that social media mobilized women but not men. My findings
challenge the Western perception of Egyptian women as either Westernized protestors or
oppressed non-activists and emphasize the gendered nature of social media.
Chapter four tracks political participation and opinions among Egyptians before
and during the transitional period that followed the overthrowing of Mubarak. Lately,
there has been increased scholarly interest in transitional periods that follow successful
non-violent anti-regime campaigns in autocratic societies. Transitologists are mainly
interested in the macro-level factors that lead to a successful transition to a functioning
democracy. However, these studies largely ignore the micro-level effects of the
transitional period on citizens’ political participation and opinions. I argue that after an
initially successful non-violent campaign, citizens will increase their political
participation, but their pro-democracy sentiments would decline. To test my argument, I
use data from the Second, Third, and Fourth waves of the Arab Democracy Barometer
survey as well as the Fifth Wave of the World Value Survey. I also use macro-level data
that track incidents of social conflict in Egypt between 2005 and 2016. I find that political
participation peaks in the middle of the transitional period, it decreases after that but stays
much higher than its levels before the uprising. The pro-democracy sentiment, however,

19
declines steadily after the uprising. Also, activists were more likely to protest than
non-activists during the transitional period. My findings add to our understanding
of transitional periods. In particular, they clarify how political uncertainty and
chaos during these critical times affect political participation and opinion among
the recently liberated citizens.
Finally, in my conclusion, I provide a discussion of my key findings. I
then discuss my contribution to the scholarship on social movements. After that, I
comment on some of the limitations of my study. I then share some suggestions
for future research. I end with a discussion of the significance and implications of
my research.
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CHAPTER TWO: RECRUITMENT TO HIGH-RISK NON-VIOLENT
CAMPAIGNS IN AUTOCRATIC CONTEXTS IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA:
STREET-PROTESTS AND ONLINE ACTIVISM
Most individuals who sympathize with the stated goals of a social movement do
very little to help them materialize, especially in high-risk situations. A fraction of a
movement’s adherents, however, choose to go into the streets, risking their own
wellbeing to advocate for their chosen causes. Those high-risk activists have been the
subject of landmark studies in the field of social movements (McAdam 1986; Wiltfang &
McAdam 1991; Nepstad & Smith 1999). Most of this body of literature is concerned with
the determinants of high-risk protest participation in Western democracies. Also, the
majority of these studies occurred before the social media revolution that took place
during the mid-2000s.
Scholars found that, in Western democracies, and before the spread of forums
such as Facebook and Twitter, strong personal ties to activists were the most significant
determinants of participation in high-risk situations. Other factors also were found to
affect participation, in some cases. For instance, individuals who had prior experiences
with activism, those who were members of organizations, and those who were
biographically available such as the unmarried, young, college students, older, retired, or
unemployed, were more likely to join high-risk campaigns (McAdam 1986; Wiltfang &
McAdam 1991; Nepstad & Smith 1999; Nepstad 2004).
Unfortunately, the applicability of these findings to non-violent campaigns in
non-democracies is unclear (but see Almeida 2008). Moreover, the effect of social media
on these findings remains largely unknown. Some scholars raise the possibility that the
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spread of the internet could have one of two effects on social movements. The internet
could facilitate the mobilization processes without fundamentally changing them, or it
could create new dynamics, which would call for updating the current theories (Earl &
Kimport 2011).
I aim to fill this gap in the literature by arguing that, in autocratic societies in the
era of social media, the internet does not replace personal ties as the most significant
determinant of participating in high-risk non-violent street-protests. Instead, social media
creates new avenues for dissent, such as online activism. Social media also empowers
insurgents by providing an opportunity to garner support from both the online and offline
spheres. Autocratic states provide their citizens with minimal legal protections and almost
non-existent freedom of press and assembly. These regimes impose extreme repressive
actions designed to create an environment of fear among citizens and cripple oppositional
movements (Faris 2013). Under such conditions, face-to-face ties mobilize because such
connections to other persons have a strong influence on behaviors in general, including
protest participation. Personal ties to activists provide the moral support and
encouragement needed to make the final push towards joining a high-risk non-violent
campaign (McAdam 1986; Nepstad & Smith 1999).
Nevertheless, scholars should not dismiss the role of the internet in mobilization.
Social media forums recruit because they create virtual communities of activists where
individuals become members of online political networks.3 These online political
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In this chapter, I distinguish between two types of activities that occur online. Online
political networking represents the virtual ties that activists cultivate with other antiregime activists on social network sites such as Facebook and Twitter. Online activism
indicates that a person “supported the protests against Mubarak through the internet, such
as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.” Online activism was a form of resistance during the
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networks strengthen activists’ collective identity, provide a constant flow of uncensored
information, grant access to diverse and unconventional anti-regime dissidents, and allow
activists to assume leadership roles (Burns & Eltham 2009; Preston 2011; DeLuca,
Lawson & Sun 2012; Gerbaudo 2012; Bonilla & Rosa 2015; Gerbaudo & Treré 2015;
Yang 2016). As such, these platforms have the potential to play a crucial role in
recruitment to online activism. Twitter and Facebook can also help street-protestors
connect with other dissenters and potential recruits. We see this function at play when
protestors use social media to broadcast real-time reports on the regime’s repression and
appeal to their fellow citizens to join their movement from the protest sites. Activists also
use social media to provide information about changes in time and places of
demonstrations based on what is happening on the ground, to report on the status of keyleaders who are especially targeted by the regime, and to seek international support
(Ghonim 2012; Faris 2013; Allam 2018).
I will use the Egyptian uprising of 2011 to test my argument because the uprising
was a non-violent high-risk movement where protestors endured repressive acts by the
riot police, counter-movements, and security forces (El-Bendary 2013). In addition,

uprising. This new form of activism included acts such as calls for protest like the video
where Asma Mahfouz called Egyptians to join the protests on January 25, 2011 (Wall &
El Zahed 2011). It also included spreading information about the logistics of protest, such
as where to go, what to bring, how to deal with the security forces, and which protests
need medical supplies or food. Activist tweeters and We Are All Khaled Said page
members engaged in this form of activism during the 18-day event. Online activists also
helped protestors stay informed about the whereabouts of the security forces throughout
the 18-days. Many of these activists supported the uprising from their homes. They got
massive amounts of information. Their role was to check the viability of the information
through multiple trusted sources on the ground and then spread the correct information.
They also used incidents of repression to mobilize more Egyptians to join the movement.
In addition, they defended the protestors against the false information and character
assassination attempts by the state media (Idle & Nunns 2011; Ghonim 2012).
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social media played at least some role in the uprising (Brym et al. 2014). I specifically
use data from the Arab Democracy Barometer Survey (2011), one of the few large-scale
representative samples of the Egyptian population that was administered about five
months after the uprising.
I aim to contribute to the social movement literature in two ways. First, I
challenge the fundamental assumption that the Arab world is different from the West.
The purpose of my research is to understand the similarities and differences between the
West and an autocratic society, such as Egypt, in order to better grasp the process of
recruitment to high-risk non-violent campaigns. Second, I aim to empirically test the
effect of social media on recruitment to high-risk movements. I push scholars to go
beyond the assumption that, in such campaigns, social media should be dismissed
because it does not dramatically increase street-protests –a view that might have some
merit in Western democracies. Instead, my research investigates how social media affects
mobilization in general.
RECRUITMENT TO HIGH-RISK CAMPAIGNS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
Scholarship on recruitment to high-risk movements has found that networks and
biographical availability are important determinants of participation in such contexts. The
model, first introduced by McAdam (1986), distinguishes between high-risk activism,
which could cause serious risk to the participant’s wellbeing, and low-risk actions such as
joining a protest on one of the US campuses. According to the model, attitudinal affinity
is an essential prerequisite to considering participation in high-risk activities. That is, for
people to contemplate participating in such campaigns, they should believe strongly in
the movement’s goals (McAdam 1986). Activists also are more likely than non-activists
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to be members of political organizations, to have participated in prior low-risk activities,
and to have strong ties to other activists who participate in the same campaign(s) as well
as weak or no ties to those who choose not to join such activities. High-risk non-violent
activists are typically young college students or older retired individuals, single, and have
no children. They generally have fewer responsibilities and more free time to pursue
high-risk activities. Finally, men are more likely to join such campaigns because they are
free from gendered social restrictions.
Empirical research in Western democracies reveals that at least some of the
above-mentioned determinants of participation in high-risk models are present in
virtually all cases of recruitment to such campaigns. However, the one most robust
finding is that personal ties to activists increase the likelihood of participation in nonviolent high-risk campaigns. McAdam (1986) found that participants of the Freedom
Summer campaign to register voters in Mississippi in 1964 had more and stronger ties to
other participants than those who were planning on going but did not make it. Personal
ties also increased participation in the 1980s’ US-Central America Peace movement,
where activists from the US traveled to the war zones of Nicaragua to protest the US
interference in the country’s politics (Nepstad & Smith 1999). In the Plowshares
movement, personal ties to other activists and a strong sense of community kept the
Catholic activists involved in the high-risk movement for years (Nepstad 2004). In the
Tucson Sanctuary movement, where activists provided sanctuary for Guatemalan and
Salvadoran refugees that the US government was trying to kidnap and deport, personal
ties to other participants increased the probability of involvement in the dangerous antigovernment activities (Wiltfang & McAdam 1991).
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These findings point to the importance of personal ties for recruitment in high-risk
situations. Face-to-face ties offer motivation for protest, reinforce movement identities,
and create strong emotional reactions such as guilt, anger, and moral outrage that
facilitate recruitment. These ties also provide social contexts for fear management and
contain people that activists trust and do not want to disappoint (McAdam 1986; Snow et
al. 1986; McAdam & Paulsen 1993; Nepstad & Smith 1999; Goodwin & Pfaff 2001;
Azab & Santoro 2017).
This scholarship was produced in Western democracies and before the existence
of online social media forums such as Facebook and Twitter. As such, their findings
leave two sets of questions unanswered. First, are organizational and relational ties still
important in settings where it is not easy to get involved in such pre-existing
organizations or to develop ties to other activists because of the strong repression of
political activists? Do the same factors matter in an authoritarian environment that offers
little space for civil society actors to meet? Second, is this model applicable in the era of
social media? Does the availability of virtual networks affect the importance of face-toface ties in the recruitment process? Would social media be able to produce unique forms
of political networks that would mobilize individuals in innovative ways?
SOCIAL MEDIA AND MOBILIZATION
Some argue that social media has a supersize effect. That is, it creates the
opportunity for large scaling the original movement processes (Earl & Kimport 2011). In
the case of online facilitation of offline action, research found that the internet increases
recruitment to street-protests (Garrett 2006; Earl et al. 2010). The internet reduces the
cost of participation (Leizerov 2000), strengthens collective identity (Myers 1994;

26
Brainard & Siplon 2000; Myers 2000; Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001), and creates a virtual
community of activists (Brainard & Siplon 2000; Elin 2003; Hampton 2003; Norris
2004). For instance, Fisher et al. (2005), using a survey of participants in five
globalization protests that took place in the US, Canada, and the Netherlands between
November 2000 and September 2005, found that the internet was crucial to large-scale
mobilization efforts. Participants used the internet to get information about common
grievances, navigate logistics of commuting to protest sites, and connect with other
activists.
Some argue that social media altered social movement processes, agreeing with
Earl and Kimport’s (2011) “theory 2.0.” This thesis suggests that the internet has the
potential to create brand-new processes that need new theories to explain them. Online
participation in offline campaigns, as well as the emergence of entirely online
campaigns, support the usage of theory 2.0 (Earl et al. 2010). For example, the strategic
vote movement, including its 2000 and 2004 campaigns in the US, was entirely organized
online (Earl 2007). Many youth-related online campaigns increasingly use social
movement tactics such as petitions against companies that affect their access to online
goods such as games and TV shows (Earl & Schussman 2008). These processes cannot
be explained using traditional social movement theories (Earl et al. 2010).
These findings, however, are mainly concerned with Western democracies. These
contexts are different from those facing activists and internet users in authoritarian
regimes in the Arab world, for example. My research adds to this body of literature by
investigating the effect of social media on recruitment to high-risk movements in
autocratic societies such as Egypt.
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THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING— A HIGH-RISK NON-VIOLENT MOVEMENT
The Egyptian uprising was an 18-day non-violent campaign that started on
January 25, 2011, the Egyptian Police Day. The uprising started as a protest
against police brutality. The stated goal rapidly evolved to become the ousting of
President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, an authoritarian military leader who had
been controlling Egypt for almost thirty years. This phase of the uprising ended
when Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011.
The uprising resulted from a combination of factors; however, the death of
Khalid Said was one of the more obvious reasons for the mass movement. Said
was a 28-year-old Alexandria social media activist. The corrupt local police
brutally murdered him on June 6, 2010. This obvious case of police brutality and
human rights violation sparked a strong reaction among Egyptians (Ghonim
2012). The backlash started with the spread in newspapers and the internet of a
photo of Said’s mutilated face right next to one of him before the attack. After
seeing the photos, Google executive, Wael Ghonim, created a memorial Facebook
page labeled “We Are All Khaled Said” that attracted hundreds of thousands of
followers. The page called for many silent protests in the months leading up to the
uprising. Eventually, the Facebook page called for a demonstration on January 25,
the Egyptian Police Day, to protest police repression and human rights violations.
Said was one of the symbols of the uprising since its beginning. Seeing activists
holding a banner of his picture before and after the police torture became a
common occurrence during the non-violent demonstrations (El-Ghobashy 2011;
Rushdy 2012; El-Bendary 2013).
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The uprising was a high-risk non-violent campaign because dissenters endured
extreme repression by the state and its agents. During the 18-days, the riot police used
repressive measures such as teargas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and live ammunition
against demonstrators. The state hired thugs on horses and camels to attack protestors
with swords during the Battle of the Camel day. In other instances, the armored police
vehicles drove into crowds of demonstrators. The Ministry of Interior hired thugs to
kidnap, rape, and torture insurgents (Ghonim 2012; Johansson-Nogues 2013; Naber &
Said 2016). The repression caused 846 death, 6,467 injuries, and an unknown number of
disappearances among dissidents during the 18-day campaign (Mungin 2011). At the
same time, protestors refused to engage in violent action against the police. They started
chanting selmeya selmeya (Arabic for peaceful) whenever the security forces attacked
them. Of course, there were some incidents of vandalism or clashes with the police, but
the general sentiment among protestors was to keep it as non-violent as possible. Also,
the Tahrir protestors did not use firearms or explosives against the security forces
(Hussein 2012). Lately, some scholars have argued that the uprising was an example of
“unarmed collective violence” (Kadivar & Ketchley 2018).
SOCIAL MEDIA, FACE-TO-FACE NETWORKS, AND RECRUITMENT TO THE
EGYPTIAN UPRISING
The lion’s share of scholarship on the role of social media in the Egyptian
uprising agrees that it played some role in recruitment (Iskander 2011; Joya 2011; Lotan
et al. 2011; Tantawy & Weist 2011; Wall & El Zahed 2011; Barrons 2012; Choudhary et
al. 2012; Kerton 2012; Mansour 2012; Shahin 2012; Ali & Fahmy 2013). Almost all
scholars also agree that social media did not “cause” the uprising because the non-violent
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campaign was caused by a complex combination of factors (Joya 2011; Brym et al.
2014). However, social media helped the uprising reach critical mass by increasing
participation (Choudhary et al. 2012). The pronounced effect of social media in
recruitment to the uprising emphasizes the importance of understanding the unique role
of online political networks in the mobilization efforts that occur in both the virtual and
the physical worlds. This investigation should be beneficial to both social movement
scholars and dissenters in similar contexts.
Scholars have found that social media increased recruitment to the Egyptian
uprising because it was a resource, more specifically a means of communication for
“resource-poor actors” such as anti-regime activists in highly repressive Egypt (Tantawy
& Weist 2011: 1208). Social media provided a way to organize new activists and
familiarize them with the logistics of protest such as how to deal with the riot police,
where and when protests will take place, and how to stay safe during demonstrations
(Beaumont et al. 2011; Joya 2011; Lotan et al. 2011; Tantawy & Weist 2011; Mansour
2012). Facebook and Twitter also provided a free space where activists were able to
express and discuss their anti-regime grievances, meet others with similar views, belong
to politicizing networks of like-minded individuals, create virtual communities, and
develop a “new political language” (Iskander 2011; Tantawy & Weist 2011; Wall & El
Zahed 2011: 1333; Barrons 2012; Shahin 2012). Face-to-face networks, both personal
and organizational, also increased protest participation during the uprising because they
validated protestor’s actions, provided emotional support, provided physical protection
against possible police repressive actions, and increased the social cost of nonparticipation (El-Ghobashy 2011; Dorsey 2012).
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I, however, argue that the social media influence goes beyond recruitment to the
street protests. Social media created new forms of activism, such as online activism,
which dissenters could solely engage in or combine with street-protests.
DATA AND METHODS
My data come from an Egyptian probability survey that was conducted from June
17 to June 30, 2011. The sample was a part of the larger Second Wave of the Arab
Democracy Barometer (2011), administered in eleven Arab countries beginning in 2010.
The survey was conducted via a partnership between the University of Michigan,
Princeton University, and universities and research centers in the Arab world. The
Egyptian organization Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, which is a
privately funded institution that is independent of the Egyptian government, conducted
the face-to-face interviews in Arabic. The survey is a representative sample of 1,219
adult Egyptians (eighteen years or older) selected from 120 residential sites across 21 of
the country’s governorates.4 The sample was drawn based on information from the
official 2006 Egyptian census that had been updated in 2010 with the CAPMPAS
Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption survey. Surveyors interviewed an
adult that they chose at random using the Kish grid from each household. The data were
weighted to account for the unequal probability of household selection.
I excluded respondents who reported that they were pro-Mubarak during the 18day uprising because they were not a part of the pool of possible recruits. To identify proMubarak Egyptians, I used the question “during the protests in Egypt between January 25
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Unfortunately, the Arab Democracy Barometer project reports do not provide
information about response rates.
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and February 11, was your position closer to supporters of former President Hosni
Mubarak, opposition against President Hosni Mubarak, or neither side.” I kept those who
were supporting neither side, those who did not know which side they supported, and
respondents who claimed to have been in opposition to Mubarak during the 18day uprising.5 This approach brought my sample size down from 1,219 to 1,048
respondents. I also dropped from the analysis respondents who had missing values
on any of my variables. My final sample size is 1,033 people, the unit of analysis.
There are many advantages to this survey. The survey was conducted only
five months after the uprising. This timing was particularly helpful because it
heightened the response rate as Egyptians were eager to share their opinions on
the new post-Mubarak political climate. Also, the data collection was close
enough to the uprising for the respondents’ recollections of their participation to
be reliable and accurate. Moreover, the survey had a detailed set of questions
about the respondents’ street-protest participation, online activism, face-to-face
connections to activists, and political networking via social media. The rich data
made it possible to assess my argument using the Arab Barometer.
Dependent variables. I used two distinct variables to measure protest
participation. The first measure represents the traditionally used operationalization, which
indicates whether the respondent “participated in the protests against former President
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I acknowledge that some pro-Mubarak respondents may have claimed to be in the
opposition out of fear of revealing their sympathies for the former ruling regime. In
Arabic, these people are referred to as felool. In my sample, 14 percent of respondents
reported pro-Mubarak sympathies, which suggest that many were, in fact, willing to
admit their views on the matter. Also, my results did not change when I included all
respondents in the analysis.
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Hosni Mubarak between January 25 and February 11, 2011.” My second measure, the
protest participation index, is a nominal variable indicating whether the respondent
participated in protest activities against the former President, Hosni Mubarak, between
January 25 and February 11, 2011, through a) “using the internet, such as Facebook,
Twitter, or YouTube” (=1), b) joining street-protests (=2), or c) doing both (=3).” I
assigned a score of zero to respondents who did not participate in any of the three forms
of dissent.
Figure 1 represents the percentage of respondents who participated in each form
of activism. It shows that more than twelve percent of my sample joined the uprising by
taking part in the street-protests and/or online activism. Also, about nine percent of the
respondents protested in the streets.
Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who participated in each form of activism
2.4%
6.4%

3.5%

87.6%

No protest

Street-protest

Online activism

Online activism & street-protest

Independent variables. I used three measures of networks. My measure of face-toface networks is based on the question, “Did any of your friends or acquaintances
participate in the protests against former President Mubarak between January 25 and
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February 11?” This is an appropriate measure of political networks because it
includes activists who actually participated in the uprising, not just politically
interested people. I coded Egyptians who had such ties as 1, 0 otherwise. Just over
30 percent of respondents had face-to-face ties to activists.
The measure of online political networking using social media is
constructed based on two criteria. First, to establish that respondents were active
users of social media, respondents were asked if they were “members of or
participants in” any internet network such as having a Facebook account, Twitter
account, a personal blog, or a dialogue board or group (1=yes, 0=otherwise).
While people could use Facebook and other online forums in a variety of ways,
most employ such internet technology to exchange information with other
selected internet users, and as such, I considered these forums as examples of
networks. Second, to ensure that respondents were using social media networks
for explicitly political rather than purely social reasons, respondents who were
active users of the internet forums also had to report that they used these forums
to find out about political activities, opposing political opinions, or to express
opinions about political issues. Based on responses to these questions, I coded
social media members who used the internet for political reasons, as 1, 0
otherwise. About eleven percent of my respondents were members of online
political networks. This is an impressive percentage, which would translate to
more than nine million participants. This widespread access to the internet in
Egypt suggests that such a medium could have been used to propel people to
protest, as many scholarly works suggest.
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Because in general organizational involvement promotes activism (Morris 1984;
McAdam 1988), and they were also crucial to recruitment to the Egyptian uprising
(Dorsey 2012; Holmes 2012; Rizzo, Price & Meyer 2012), I used a dichotomous variable
to represent respondents’ membership in one or more organizations, including charitable,
youth, sports, and family/tribal association (1=yes, 0=no).
Figure 2 represents individual membership in networks for each form of
activism.6 I found that face-to-face ties were the most common networking method
among all types of activists –street-protestors, online activists, and those who engaged in
both forms of dissent. However, the percentage of activists who had face-to-face ties was
highest for those who participated in street as well as online protest, reaching 100
percent. This means that there were no respondents who participated in both forms of
activism who did not have friends or acquaintances participating in the demonstrations of
January 25 to February 11, 2011. About 81 percent of street-protestors had face-to-face
ties to other activists. Face-to-face ties were also high among online activists. More than
three in four online activists had a friend who joined the street-protests. In general,
organizational membership was low among the Egyptian population. Only 7.5 percent of
my sample were members of formal or quasi-formal organizations. However, it was
relatively high among dissenters. More than half of those who participated in both forms
of activism were organization members. In addition, about one in five street-protestors
and online activists were members of organizations. Online activists were more likely to
be members of online political networks than street-protestors, but activists who engaged

6

I provide weighted means of all of my variables for the total sample, protestors, streetprotestors, online activists, and those who participated in both forms of activism in
Appendix A.
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in both types of activism were the most likely to be politically engaged online.
Figure 2. Networks membership for each form of activism
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I measured biographical availability using various demographic variables
that are known to affect a person’s likelihood of participating in high-risk
campaigns (McAdam 1986; McAdam 1988; Nepstad & Smith 1999). I coded
women 1, men 0. Egyptian women were highly visible in the uprising, and some
observers estimated that between twenty and fifty percent of the protestors were
women (Wall & El Zahed 2011; Kadry 2015). Some scholars suggest that
younger Egyptians were more likely to protest in general as well as during the
uprising (Dorsey 2012). I tracked age using the survey question that asked about
the respondent’s age, and I also calculated an age-squared variable. I coded
people who were married as 1, 0 otherwise. I coded those who were unemployed
and thus had more time to protest as 1, 0 otherwise.
Control variables. I incorporated thirteen controls. Higher socioeconomic
status facilitates protest participation (McCarthy & Zald 1977), including in the
Egyptian uprising (Kandil 2012). I used three dummy variables to capture
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monthly household income in Egyptian pounds (EGP): those who were middle or uppermiddle class earning between 4,500 and 15,000 EGP monthly, those who were poor,
lower, or lower-middle class, earning less than 4,500 EGP a month (the omitted
category), and a category for those who did not disclose their income. Using the dummy
variable approach allowed me to avoid estimating income for the eleven percent of
respondents who did not report income. I accounted for education using a dichotomous
variable representing those with a bachelor’s degree or higher (=1).
I controlled for “grievances” using a dichotomous variable representing those who
reported that they were in the “opposition against President Hosni Mubarak” during the
18-day event (=1). I coded as 0 those who answered that they were neither supporters nor
in opposition, and those who claimed that they did not know. To account for political
interest, I coded those who reported that they follow political news in Egypt to “a great
extent” as 1, 0 otherwise. I also measured religious affiliation, where I coded Christians
as 1 and Muslims 0 because I expected Christians to be unlikely to have protested given
that many scholars perceive them as apolitical, likely because of repression encountered
daily (Guirguis 2012).7
The city of Cairo, and Tahrir Square, in particular, were the epicenter of the
Egyptian uprising (Ghonim 2012). I, therefore, took into consideration place of residence
using five dummy variables. These variables represent Cairo Province (the governorates
of Cairo, Giza, and Qaliubiya; the omitted category); Alexandria Province (Alexandria
and Beheira); Canal Province (Port Said, Suez, Eastern, and Ismailia); Delta Province

7

No respondents in the survey claimed any other religious affiliation. Of the original
1,219 respondents, 71 were Christians, 1,144 were Muslims, and 4 respondents had
missing data for this question.
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(Damietta, Dakahlia, Kafr el-Sheikh, Western, and Menoufia); and the UpperEgypt Provinces (Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Assiut, Sohag, Qena, and Aswan). I
also used a dichotomous variable to account for urban residence (=1).
Analytic strategy. I utilized logistic regression for Table 1 because protest is a
dichotomous variable. I reported metric coefficients, which indicate that for a unit change
in the predictor variable, the log-odds of protest changes by its respective parameter
estimate holding constant all other variables. For Table 2, I used multinomial logistic
regression because I was examining the determinants of choosing one form of protest
over not protesting controlling for the two other forms of dissent. This technique is
preferable to running a series of logistic regressions because it uses the entire sample in
the analysis (Long & Freese 2014). For instance, if I ran a model to determine whether
respondents protested in the street or did not protest at all, I would be dropping from the
analysis respondents who protested online or who protested both online and in the streets.
Theoretically, I posit that each of my three forms of protest is distinguishable from the
other two. For example, I claim that the determinants of involvement in both streetprotests and online activism are different from the determinants of participation in any of
those types alone (i.e., street-protests or online activism). I used the Wald test for
combining alternatives to examine this assumption and found that all categories are
indeed distinguishable. I also found that collinearity is not a problem. No bivariate
correlation was above .6, and no variable had a variation inflation factor (VIF) score
above 1.36.8 I used Average Marginal Effects (AME) to calculate predicted probabilities

8

Researchers should be concerned about collinearity if bivariate correlation is above .8 or
VIF is above 2.5 (Midi, Sarkar & Rana 2010).
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and changes in probabilities for the logit and multinomial models. I used Stata 13 to
estimate my models.
RESULTS
Table 1 represents the basic Western-inspired model that predicts whether the
respondent joined a protest or demonstration during the 18-day Egyptian uprising of
2011. The results show that both traditional types of networks affected protest
participation. Personal ties to other activists and organizational membership were
positively associated with protest participation. Having a friend who was a protestor
increased the probability of joining a protest from 2.3 percent to 18.9 percent, when
holding all other variables in the model constant. Being a member of charitable, youth,
sports, local, or tribal organization increased the probability of protest from 8.1 percent to
12.7 percent, at the more lenient .075 level. Political networking via social media,
however, had no statistically significant effect on participation in the anti-regime protests.
My results show some support for the importance of biographical availability to
high-risk recruitment. Women were less likely to participate in the uprising than men.
The probability of protest for women was 5.0 percent, while it was 12.0 percent for men.
Age had an inverted-U curvilinear effect on protest participation. Older Egyptians were
more likely to protest than their younger counterparts until the age of 39.7 years. After
that age, older people tend to protest less. The probability of protest for married
Egyptians was 5.8 percent less than unmarried individuals, although the results were
significant only at the more lenient level of .075. Being unemployed had no statistically
significant effect on participation.
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Table 1. Logistic regression of protest participation on networks, biographical
availability, and controls (n=1,033)
Protest participation
b
SE
Networks
Face-to-face networks

2.514 **
0.357
-0.001
0.368
0.682 †
0.382

On-line political networks
Organizational involvement
Biographical availability
a
Female

-1.225
0.304
0.192
0.087
-0.002
0.001
-0.892
0.460
-0.403
0.574

Age
Age squared
Married
Unemployed
Class controls
b
High income
b

c

College graduate

Political interest controls
d
Anti-Mubarak

*
†

0.823
0.638
0.534 †
0.286

Political interest
Religion
Coptic Christiane

-0.553
0.554

Regional controls
f
Alexandria province

-0.789
0.459
-0.722
0.427
-0.894
0.454
-0.806
0.446
-0.012
0.329
-6.620
1.682
7.25

f

Canal province

Delta provincef
f

Urbang
Constant
F-statistic
a

*

-0.204
0.842
0.005
0.397
0.327
0.330

Missing income

Upper Egypt provinces

**

b

c

†
†
*
†

**
**

Notes: reference category male; reference category low income; reference category
no college degree; d reference category no preference or not sure; e reference category
Muslim; f reference category Cairo; g reference category rural; † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p <
.01 (two-tailed)
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As for my control variables, residents of all provinces were less likely to protest
than those who lived in Cairo. Also, respondents who reported being interested in politics
were more likely to protest than others. Religion, urban residency, and being antiMubarak did not affect protest participation significantly.
Table 2 adds nuance to the original protest model by differentiating between
participation in street-protests only, online activism only, or being engaged in both forms
of activism.9 Equation 1 assesses the likelihood of engaging in street-protests versus not
participating in the uprising. Face-to-face networks seemed to have a strong effect on
street-protests. Those who had a friend, relative, or acquaintance who protested during
the uprising had a 15.6 percent probability of joining a protest or demonstration, whereas
those with no such ties had a 2.1 percent probability of protesting. Other networks, such
as organizational membership or online political ties, had no statistically significant effect
on participation. Biographical availability seemed to have some effect on participation in
street-protests. Women were less likely than men to demonstrate. The predicted
probability of protest for women was 3.3 percent, but it was 9.4 percent for men. Age had
a concave curvilinear effect on participation. The inflection point was 34.6 years of age.
Marital and employment statuses did not influence participating in street-protests

9

In a supplemental Analysis, I re-ran Table 2 with different model specifications in
Appendix E. In that model, I excluded the anti-Mubarak variable. I also recoded the
respondent’s province into a single dummy variable that represents whether the
respondent lived in Cairo (=1). In addition, I ran two different multinomial logistic
regression models to test the effect of online and organizational networks on respondents
who were members of face-to-face networks (Appendix F) and those who are not. Results
for respondents who were not members of face-to-face networks were not meaningful
because of “completely determined observations and questionable standard errors,”
according to the Stata output. This might have resulted from the small number of
respondents who participated in online activism only or street protest only.
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significantly.
Equation 2 predicts engagement in online activism as opposed to nonparticipation. Face-to-face networks were positively related to the probability of online
activism. Having such networks more than doubled the probability of participating in
online action (5.0 percent vs. 2.4 percent). Online political ties, however, increased the
probability of online activism by about 800 percent (1.5 percent vs. 11.7 percent).
Organizational membership did not affect the probability of online involvement.
Biographical availability generally had no clear effect on this form of dissent. The only
exception was that women were less likely to engage in such activities than men, based
on the more relaxed .075 level of significance. Socioeconomic status seemed to have
some effect on online activism. Those who had a bachelor’s degree or higher were more
likely than those without a college degree to support the uprising through online action
(5.7 percent vs. 2.1 percent). Respondents who claimed to be anti-Mubarak, rather than
undecided, were more likely to protest online. The effect of place of residence on this
form of protest was mixed.
Equation 3 examines the probability that a respondent participated in both online
activism and street-protests. I found that such activists were more likely than nonprotestors to be highly connected. For instance, they were more likely to have face-toface ties, be politically engaged online (3.7 percent vs. 1.5 percent), and to be members of
organizations (4.4 percent vs. 1.8 percent).10 There were no statistically significant
gender differences among those insurgents (p= .22). They also were less likely to be

10

All activists who participated in both forms of activism were members of face-to-face
networks. Because of that, the true size of the effect of face-to-face ties is undetermined.
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married, and more likely to be interested in politics than non-activists.
Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression of protest participation on networks and controls
(n=1,033)

Networks
Face-to-face networks
On-line political networks
Organizational involvement
Biographical availability
a
Female
Age
Age squared
Married
Unemployed
Class controls
High incomeb
Missing incomeb
College graduatec
Political interest controls
d
Anti-Mubarak
Political interest
Religion
Coptic Christiane
Regional controls
f
Alexandria province
f

Canal province

f

Delta province

Upper Egypt provinces f
Urbang
Constant

Equation 1

Equation 2

Street-protest
vs. no protest

On-line activism
vs. no protest

b
SE

b
SE

Equation 3
Street-protest
& on-line activism
vs. no protest
b
SE

2.500 **
0.372
0.088
0.441
0.502
0.479

1.659 **
0.557
2.649 **
0.558
0.448
0.790

16.482 **
0.494
1.728 *
0.872
1.610 *
0.640

-1.391 **
0.337
0.201 *
0.091
-0.002 *
0.001
-0.813
0.500
-0.353
0.648

-0.947 †
0.509
-0.132
0.130
0.001
0.001
-0.064
0.793
-0.618
0.746

-0.839
0.684
0.185
0.217
-0.003
0.003
-1.860 *
0.783
-1.092
0.920

-0.558
1.348
0.226
0.401
0.467
0.377

1.108
0.848
0.506
0.770
1.466 **
0.475

1.148
0.874
-1.226
0.784
0.605
0.605

1.800
1.165
0.224
0.329

15.627 **
0.446
0.102
0.479

-0.240
0.921
1.462 **
0.567

-0.795
0.684

-0.161
1.228

0.027
0.899

-0.556
0.487
-0.565
0.489
-0.709
0.475
-0.372
0.485
-0.041
0.346
-7.962 **
1.937

-16.464 **
0.554
0.948
0.801
-0.059
0.902
1.270 †
0.740
-0.005
0.668
-18.020 **
2.709

-2.951 *
1.355
-0.628
0.923
-1.504
1.258
-1.093
1.043
0.060
0.771
-21.068 **
4.441

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category low income; c reference category
no college degree; d reference category no preference or not sure; e reference category
Muslim; f reference category Cairo; g reference category rural; † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p <
.01 (two-tailed)
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DISCUSSION
The traditional model. Table 1 represents the traditional model, in which the focus
was on participation in street-protests regardless of whether the respondents participated
in any other forms of protest. My results show that the predictors of protest participation
in street-demonstrations during the Egyptian uprising of 2011 mirrored that of high-risk
activism in Western democracies.
Networks. Face-to-face networks had the highest effect on participation. This was
expected because the Egyptian uprising was an exceptionally high-risk situation.
Protestors were openly discussing the possibility of being hurt, captured and tortured, or
killed since the first day of the protests (Mayton 2011). Similar to the Freedom Summer
campaign that took place in 1964 in the US (McAdam 1988), face-to-face ties were the
most effective recruitment method because they represented meaningful and salient
relationships one had to relatives and close friends. Organizational involvement increased
protest as well. Organizations provide a space where people could develop a collective
identity, become a part of a community of activists, gain leadership skills, learn about as
well as articulate grievances, and be surrounded by like-minded individuals who share
similar beliefs. The effect of organizations on social movements in the West is well
documented. For instance, organizational membership played a crucial role in recruitment
to the civil rights movement, the Plowshares movement, and other campaigns (Morris
1984; McAdam 1986; McAdam 1988; Taylor 1989; Gould 1991; Nepstad 2004). In the
case of the Egyptian uprising, however, organizational membership was generally low
among the population. Only seven percent of my sample were members of organizations.
This is quite different from Freedom Summer, where 86 percent of participants and 82
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percent of non-activists belonged to at least one organization (McAdam 1986).
Nonetheless, organizations such as the ultra-soccer fan clubs had a notable role in
mobilizing people. The sports organization politicized its members, many of whom
encountered the ultra-soccer group and were politicized online, long before the uprising
to be anti-establishment and pro-human rights (Dorsey 2012).
Biographical availability. Women were less likely than men to participate in the
street- protests. These results are consistent with finding from McAdam’s (1986)
Freedom Summer study. He found that gender restrictions, such as parents’ fear for their
daughters’ safety generally restricted women’s ability to participate in the high-risk
campaign. Egyptian women, however, participated to a surprising extent, more than four
percent of female respondents joined the street-protests. In a country of more than 42
million female citizens, this percentage translates to more than 1.8 million Egyptian
women taking to the streets during the 18-day uprising. However, women still
participated less than men because of the cultural and familial limitations that a genderrestrictive country places on women’s freedom of mobility and freedom from violence.
Prior to the uprising, the Egyptian regime systematically used sexual violence against
female protestors to humiliate and violate these activists. The riot police also used to
sexually assault female dissenters, arrest them as prostitutes, and register them as sex
criminals (Johansson-Nogues 2013; Amnesty International 2015).
Age had an inverted-U curvilinear effect on participation. While the popular lore
attributes the uprising to youth-driven movement (Holmes 2012), I found older
individuals more likely to participate. This relationship was reversed after the age of 39.7.
These results partially agree with McAdam’s (1986) findings in the case of Freedom
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Summer, where younger individuals were generally more likely than older people to
protest. But, among younger individuals, the relatively older ones had more freedom to
participate. In the Egyptian case, the economic structure, high percentage of
unemployment, and education system caused many individuals to stay dependent on their
parents for longer (World Economic Forum 2011). Because of that, older respondents
were more independent and likely to join the protests. By mid to late-thirties, people start
to have familial responsibilities related to both their aging parents and their own new
families, and they become biographically unavailable. Marital status was negatively
associated with protest. As Goodwin (1997) found in his study of the Huk rebellion in the
Philippines, marriage and family relations decrease participation in high-risk campaigns
because such relations weaken a person’s identification and solidarity with the
movement. They decrease a person’s willingness to give his/her life for the chosen
political cause as well (Goodwin 1997). McAdam (1986) also found that such relations
prevent people from participating in high-cost activism for lack of free time.
Controls. Those who were politically aware were more likely to protest, but
grievances (being anti-Mubarak) had no effect. These results agree with the Western
model that grievances are not always important to recruitment because they are
constantly present. It takes other factors besides grievances to get people to protest in
highly repressive contexts (McAdam 1982). Finally, residents of all provinces protested
less than Cairo residents because Tahrir Square was the epicenter of the uprising. There
were protests in almost all of the Egyptian provinces, but Cairo was the birthplace of the
non-violent campaign (Ghonim 2012; Faris 2013).
Other factors could have facilitated recruitment to the uprising. For instance, after
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some protestors lost their lives or were critically injured during the first few days of the
uprising, many felt the responsibility to avenge those martyrs and heroes. Protestors used
the defiant slogan “ya negeeb haaohom ya nemoot zayohom,” which translates to “either
we avenge them, or we die like them,” widely during the uprising. Also, the We Are All
Khaled Said page posted pictures of the martyrs and the injured throughout the uprising.
Many comments were calling on Egyptians to join the protests and to avenge the fallen.
In addition, the large numbers of protestors could have encouraged people to join
the protests. For example, on January 22, 2011. Three days before the uprising, the We
Are All Khaled Said claimed that they mobilized enough people to ensure that the
uprising will succeed. Also, many social media forums, oppositional newspapers, and
international TV channels were broadcasting pictures of the uprising and the remarkably
large number of protestors during the 18-day event. This extensive coverage could have
encouraged people to join the movement.
Street-protest only. Table 2 provides a more detailed examination of the
determinants of protest. Equation 1 shows that those who joined the street-protests but
did not engage in online activism were different from those who did not join the antiregime campaign. In terms of networks, face-to-face ties were the most influential
recruitment tool. Having personal ties to other activists increased street-protest
significantly for the reasons mentioned above. Organizational membership lost its partial
significance in this model, likely because most Egyptian social movements organizations
such as the April 6th movement, the ultra-soccer fan clubs, and Kefaya have an online
component. For that reason, many of the members of these organizations would fall into
the category that participated in both online and street activities. Regarding biographical
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availability, women were less likely to protest than men. This is understandable because
street-protest is the most confrontational type of dissent. It is especially dangerous for
women in a country where 99.7% of the women have experienced sexual harassment and
where the regime regularly uses sexual violence against female protestors (JohanssonNogues 2013; Amnesty International 2015). Finally, age still had an inverted-U
curvilinear effect on protest.
Online activism only. Equation 2 in Table 2 compares those who participated in
online activism but did not join the street-protests to those who did not take part in the
uprising. Here we see a real divergence from the traditional model. For the first time,
online political networks had a significant effect on activism. People who were politically
engaged online used forums such as Facebook and Twitter to express their political
views, learn about political issues, and connect to opposition movements. During the 18day event, these activists were more likely to use their virtual platforms to support the
uprising in any way (Faris 2013). Online activists played an undeniably important role
during the uprising because of the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian regime and the
lack of free press (Faris 2013). For example, online activists provided protestors on the
ground with accurate information about the positions of the riot police, the locations of
stranded activists needing support to ward-off the pro-regime thugs and/or security
forces, and the relatively safe areas where women protestors could escape the wrath of
the regime’s repressive agents (Idle & Nunns 2011). These pieces of information were
not available on the regime-controlled television and radio stations. Online activists also
encouraged people to join the protest by posting videos of the security forces torturing
protestors and pleading for Egyptians to take to the streets and support their fellow
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citizens (Idle & Nunns 2011).
Face-to-face networks, nonetheless, were still important for online activism. Such
ties doubled the probability of participating in online activism. Having personal ties to
protestors compelled online activists who were unable to join the street-protests to
continue to support their friends through online activism (Khamis & Vaughn 2011;
Khamis & Vaughn 2013). Those virtual protestors also were more likely to have access
to “on-the-ground” information through their connections to street-protestors (Ghonim
2012; Faris 2013).
Although only statistically significant at the .075 level, women were less likely to
participate in online activism than men because, in an autocratic gender-restrictive
environment such as Egypt, women have less access to resources such as the internet
(World Economic Forum 2011). In Egypt, women and girls have less access to resources,
in general, within the same household. In many cases, women do not share material
resources in the home equally (Roushdy 2004). Egypt suffers from a gendered digital
divide. For instance, Badran (2014) found that, in the same household, men are more
likely to be working than women. As a result, men have more access to the internet
because they are more able to buy smartphones and computers, as well as pay for the
internet. Also, many Egyptians access the internet through internet cafes. Because of the
restriction on women’s movement, men are more likely to frequent these cafes than
women (Badran 2014). The unequal access could have caused this slight difference in
online activism between the genders.
We see that all my measures of biographical availability had no significant effect
on online activism. This, I hypothesize, is the result of the relatively low-cost nature of
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online activities compared to street-protests. But remember that online activism in an
autocratic society is still high-risk. For example, the security apparatus kidnapped the
administrator of We Are All Khalid Said Facebook page, Wael Ghonim, during the
uprising (Ghonim 2012). Also, the regime regularly arrested and tortured activists as a
way of controlling the online sphere before the uprising (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2012).
Still, supporting the uprising from home, and under the veil of relative anonymity, was
low-cost compared to being on the street, facing the immediate wrath of the regime’s
repressive agents. Both forms of protest, however, are high-risk compared to McAdam’s
(1986:68) example of a low-risk protest such as joining an “anti-nuke” rally on-campus
in the US, where the chance of harm was almost non-existent.
Online and street-protest. Table 2, Equation 3, shows how those who participated
in both online as well as street-protest were different from those who did not participate
in the uprising. An activist who participated in both forms of protest was more likely to
be a member of all three types of networks. Because such activists were particularly well
connected, and because they had access to social media forums as well as organizational
networks, they were some of the more influential figures in the movement. Some of these
activists became de facto leaders of the uprising, and many people looked to them for
legitimate information about the happenings on the ground as well as suggestions on
what their next moves should be (Ghonim 2012; Faris 2013). One example during the
Egyptian uprising is their role in handling Mubarak’s emotional speech on February 1,
2011. In it, Mubarak claimed that he made some concessions, such as changing the
government. He promised to reform the police force, end corruption, create more jobs,
reform the economy, achieve social justice, and amend the constitution to guarantee more
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political freedoms. He also reminded the people that he was a war-hero and promised not
to seek re-election. This speech divided the activists on the ground. Many of them
empathized with the dictator and believed that the movement achieved its goals based on
his promises. This new development created a huge debate, both on the ground and on
social media, about whether to stay in Tahrir Square or to end the movement. Activists
on the ground, who also were social media influencers, such as Alaa Abdel Fatah, Asmaa
Mahfooz, Nawara Nagem, and others, convinced many protestors to stay in the square.
These activists were a part of the reason that the uprising kept going, until Mubarak had
to resign because they were powerfully present both online and in the physical world
(Idle & Nunns 2011; Faris 2013). Of course, not every person who protested in the streets
and used social media was influential; however, such people were typically more
influential than others. Also, remember that not every “leader” has to lead hundreds of
thousands or get millions to join a movement. Some leaders could just inspire a handful
of people to support a part of the movement’s goals (Robnett 2000).
In terms of biographical availability, this hybrid activist was as likely to be a
woman as a man. This could be why some believed that there was an equal number of
female and male protestors. The hyper-visibility of female activists who were both streetprotestors and social media influencers might have caused onlookers to over-estimate the
number of female dissenters and normalized the image of Egyptian women as protestors
(Hafez 2012).
This type of activist might be more influential to some extent. She can influence
people on the ground as well as at home, and even in the global community through the
intersection of street and online activism. The presence of this new activist hints at how

51
social media can enhance social movements’ processes by creating a different type of
movement participants. Those new dissenters can lead people to join events on the
ground and support anti-regime actions through social media forums, using their dual
pulpits.
CONCLUSION
This paper is an attempt at understanding more fully how the traditional model of
recruitment to high-risk movements that was developed in Western democracies before
the social media revolution would apply to autocratic societies in the new era of social
media. I used the case of the Egyptian uprising of 2011 to explore this topic. I argued that
personal networks would still be one of the most important predictors of protest
participation. However, this is not the end of the story. Most scholars and political
analysts who followed the Egyptian uprising agreed that social media played a role. I
maintain that the story of how social media created new forms of activism, and a more
powerful type of activist, remained untold. Social movement scholarship has been fixated
on how social media affect street-protests, missing McAdam’s (1986) point that most
movements have different forms of participation besides street-protests.
While this paper contributes to the literature on recruitment to high-risk
movements, it has some limitations. Egypt is just one case of an autocratic society where
social media played a role in mobilizing anti-regime activists. More research is needed to
test whether these findings apply to other “Arab Spring” countries, such as Tunisia.
Another limitation, as with any cross-sectional data, is the causality concerns. Some
might argue that I am not always able to establish the temporal order with certainty. My
estimates represent associations between protest participation and networks, and future
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research would benefit from panel data that would allow for stronger causal claims.
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CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL MEDIA AS A RECRUITMENT TOOL TO HIGHRISK MOVEMENTS IN GENDER RESTRICTIVE REGIMES
Social movement campaigns started using the internet as a recruitment tool in the
mid-1990s, but the development of social media forums in the mid-2000s revolutionized
the mobilization potential of the internet (Earl & Kimport 2011). Scholars especially
highlight the importance of social media for recruitment during the “Arab Spring,” and
no case got as much attention as Egypt. Indeed, many argue that the 2011 Egyptian
uprising was a Facebook-driven campaign. This means that without social media, the
leaders of the uprising could not have recruited enough street protestors to successfully
remove Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, the military dictator who ruled Egypt for almost 30
years (Khamis 2011; Khamis & Vaughn 2011; Ghonim 2012; Shahin 2012; Faris 2013;
El-Nawawy & Khamis 2014; but see Barrons 2012). Following the Tahrir Square model,
activists worldwide used social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube for
mobilization during the protest wave that swept Europe and the US in 2011 (DeLuca,
Lawson & Sun 2012).
Unfortunately, despite the importance of social media for mobilization, research
has yet to consider the actors’ social location within their specific historical, social, and
political contexts. This is not unique to the study of social media. McAdam (1992: 1234)
lamented that social movement scholars who study “the dynamics of individual activism”
fail to acknowledge that the experiences of women activists are qualitatively different
from men. Many scholars, mistakenly, assume that recruitment tools act the same for all
people. That omission is especially problematic when we try to understand recruitment to
high-risk non-violent movements in gender-restrictive authoritarian settings, such as the
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Arab world.
I aim to contribute to the literature by arguing that social media are especially
mobilizing for women in high-risk gender-restrictive contexts. Women in such situations
have limited, and often censored, access to the public sphere (Sharabi 1988). Social
media, in most cases, is one of the few available free spaces where women could be
politically engaged. Under the veil of anonymity, women are able to safely participate in
articulating views, exchanging ideas, and consuming information about off-limit public
and political issues. Women also get the opportunity to interact with diverse political
actors online (El-Nawawy & Khamis 2014).
To test my argument that political networking using social media forums is
successful in mobilizing women more than men to high-risk non-violent political action
in gender-restrictive environments, I use the Arab Democracy Barometer (2011). The
representative sample of Egyptians was taken five months after the 18-day uprising.
Egypt is a particularly well-suited case study. Despite living in a gender-restrictive
context, Egyptian women constituted about 20-50 percent of the protestors during the
2011 uprising (Allam 2018).11 Also, most observers of the uprising agree that social
media played at least some role in mobilizing people to join the street protests. This
should not be surprising since Egypt has the largest number of internet users in the Arab
world, a long history of political blogging that dates back to 1995, and mostly uncensored
internet compared to other Arab countries such as Tunisia (Faris 2013).

11

There is no accurate count of the percentage of women who participated in the
uprising. Because of that, there are many estimates that range from women being 20
percent to half of the protestors. I contribute to this debate by offering an estimate based
on information from the Arab Democracy Barometer survey (2011), a representative
sample of Egyptians. According to my sample, 22.4 percent of protestors were women.
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I aim to make two contributions. First, my focus on women activists within a
gender-restrictive society rejects the orientalist dichotomy of Arab women as either
oppressed non-activists or “Westernized” protestors. Some view the majority of Arab
women as passive, oppressed, backward, and apathetic. As such, they need rescuing in
the form of Western-sponsored non-governmental human rights organizations or Western
technology like social media. In this view, women activists in Arab countries such as
Egypt are seen as the exception. They are perceived as socially liberal, from a higher
socioeconomic background, and recipients of foreign education as well as a “Western
background” (Allam 2018: 66). I contend that Egyptian women, regardless of class,
education, and Western ideology, took advantage of the free space that the internet
created to empower themselves, and other Egyptians, to participate in the 2011 uprising.
Second, most scholarly work in this area investigates whether online political networks
matter to recruitment in general, treating social media as gender-neutral. As a result,
many studies find that face-to-face ties are more effective in recruitment to street-protests
in high-risk contexts. I go a step further by examining the more nuanced issue of the
conditions under which social media mobilizes. I maintain that dismissing social media
as a recruitment tool is doing a great disservice to activists in highly repressive and
gender-restrictive regimes.
THE INTERNET/SOCIAL MEDIA AS A RECRUITMENT TOOL
Online mobilization started during the mid-1990s and spread in the early 2000s.
Since then, many social movements have used the internet, with varying degrees, in their
campaigns (Earl 2006; Earl & Kimport 2011). The great popularity of social media
forums during the mid-2000s transformed and enhanced online recruitment (Shirky
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2011).
Social Media mobilizes because it provides a free space where individuals
become politically engaged by joining virtual communities of activists and developing a
sense of collective identity. For example, in the #BlackLivesMatter movement, tweeting
and/or re-tweeting their hashtag created a sense of community among Black American
tweeters because they all shared the political, moral, and emotional meaning that the
hashtag, #BlackLivesMatter, represents (Gerbaudo & Treré 2015; Yang 2016).
Social media politicizes through the constant flow of massive amounts of raw and
uncensored information. Twitter and Facebook kept the protest activities of the Occupy
Wall Street movement in the US visible and countered the traditional media’s dismissal
of the dissenters (Preston 2011; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012). Social media also
facilitates the spread of information about state repression and increases empathy towards
movements. The Iranian Green movement of 2009 gained momentum after a protestor
posted a YouTube video of the shooting and killing of a young female dissenter, Neda
Agha-Soltan (Burns & Eltham 2009).
Social media politicizes through providing access to diverse and, in many cases,
unconventional people, such as activists, who are in many cases outside a person’s
limited face-to-face networks. In the instances of the Occupy Wall Street movement and
the Iranian Green uprising, many people did not access information about the protests
through their face-to-face networks or the traditional media. Instead, they gained
knowledge of these movements by interacting with activists through social media forums
(Burns & Eltham 2009; Preston 2011; DeLuca, Lawson & Sun 2012). As evident, many
scholars agree that social media could mobilize. However, the gendered effect of social

57
media on protest participation in high-risk gender-restrictive contexts remains unknown.
WOMEN AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
The social movement literature established that women’s experiences during and
after participating in collective action are different from that of men. For instance,
women are less likely to participate in high-risk activism. In the case of the Freedom
Summer campaign that aimed at registering voters in Mississippi in 1964, many of the
women who applied to the campaign did not make it because their parents were worried
about their safety. Other female applicants were not accepted, which caused the number
of female activists to be significantly less than men (McAdam 1986). Experiences within
social movements are also gendered. In the anti-draft movement of the 1960s, for
example, women’s role in the movement was perceived as merely supportive and less
central to the success of the movement when compared with the role of men. Men’s
actions, such as refusal to register for the draft, carry a draft card, or accept the draft were
seen as heroic because, in many cases, they led to imprisonment (Thorne 1975).
Similarly, women’s experiences with leadership, repression, recruitment to riots, and
consequences of activism are different from those of their male counterparts (McAdam
1992; Robnett 1996; Santoro & Broidy 2014). However, we do not know if the effect of
social media on recruitment is gendered.
WOMEN IN EGYPT: A GENDER RESTRICTIVE SOCIETY
While most countries are gender restrictive to a certain extent, some places are
more so than others. For instance, the World Economic Forum Report (2011) measured
gender equality across four dimensions, including economic opportunity, educational
attainment, health care, and political participation. Egypt was ranked number 125 out of
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134 countries, whereas the US, for example, occupied the nineteenth spot. Both countries
are gender-restrictive, but Egypt is much more so.
Egypt is a gender restrictive society (Sharabi 1988; Rizzo, Price & Meyer 2012).
Despite gaining increased access to education and workforce participation since the
1950s, the majority of Egyptian women still have not achieved economic independence,
gender equality, or sexual freedom. For example, in 2014, about one-quarter of Egyptian
women were unemployed, and 37 percent of Egyptian females over the age of ten were
illiterate. In 2007, only thirty women were judges in Egypt (World Bank 2009; Amnesty
International 2015). In 2008, only 1.8 percent of the Egyptian parliamentarians were
women (World Bank 2009). Among Egyptian youth, in 2003, boys reported having more
freedom to leave the family home than girls, and they were twice as likely to go out with
friends. Boys were also ten times more likely than girls to play sports (World Bank
2009). In Egypt, it is still debatable whether a Muslim woman should be allowed to go to
the mosque to pray (Katz 2014).
This shocking gap in gender equality results, in part, from the interaction between
state and non-state repression of Egyptian women. In terms of state repression, Egypt has
a slew of discriminatory laws that privilege male citizens. For instance, polygamy is legal
for men only. A man can divorce his wife with no grounds, without going to court, or
informing her. A woman must go through years of court proceedings to prove (to a male
judge) that the marriage is causing her “harm.” Since 2001, the Khula Law, allowed
women a no-fault divorce if she agreed to give up all her financial rights. Egypt has an
“Obedience Law” that allows a man to force his wife, who escaped the marital home, to
return against her will. A Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim woman, but a Muslim
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woman cannot do the same. Domestic violence and spousal rape are not crimes. “Honor
crimes,” including murders (47 percent of all female homicides), receive reduced
sentences if committed by men, but not women (World Bank 2009). Abortion is illegal
unless there is a risk to the mother’s life, and it must be done with the husband’s consent.
Punishable rape includes only engaging in “sexual intercourse with a female without her
consent,” excluding many other forms of rape. By law, a woman inherits half what a man
inherits (Allam 2015).
State agents such as police officers are slow to respond to instances of sexual
harassment, and they usually blame the women for somehow causing the incidents. In
domestic violence cases, they discourage women from filing official reports, and many
women reported sexual violence during the filing process. Women in state custody are
subjected to both physical and sexual torture by security forces, including beating,
electric shocks, groping, inappropriate touching, and even rape. Sexual harassment and
rape of female political prisoners in Egypt have been used as a form of state-sponsored
unofficial punishment for years (Amnesty International 2015). For example, in 2005,
female protestors were sexually assaulted by a mob hired by the authorities during a
demonstration against a constitutional referendum (Amnesty International 2015).
In terms of non-state repression, about one-third of Egyptian women will suffer
from some form of domestic violence in their lifetime. Violence includes verbal,
physical, and sexual abuse, inability to leave the house, and lack of access to education
and medical treatment. Over sixty percent of ever-married women have experienced
spousal violence. More than ninety-nine percent of women and girls in Egypt have been
subjected to sexual harassment such as catcalling, sexual remarks, groping, sexual
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gestures, and exposure of male sexual organs. Women protestors usually face sexual
violence by thugs and, in some instances, fellow protestors (Amnesty International 2015).
These extreme experiences of state and non-state violent and repressive actions
created an environment that is threatening, intimidating, hostile, degrading, and
humiliating for women in Egypt. This atmosphere violates women’s fundamental rights,
such as the right to life, physical and sexual security, and freedom from torture and illtreatment. In addition, it prevents many women from enjoying their civil rights, such as
freedom of expression and assembly (Allam 2015; Amnesty International 2015). I argue
that Egyptian women have limited safe and easy access to the public sphere and face-toface politicizing networks that usually take place in colleges, mosques, sports
organizations, work, or even street corners. As a result, they use the relative safety and
anonymity of social media forums for political networking.
THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING
The Egyptian uprising was an 18-day non-violent campaign that started on
January 25, 2011, the National Police Day. On February 11, 2011, President Hosni
Mubarak was forced to resign after almost thirty years in office. He was replaced by the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is the governing body of the
Egyptian military. We Are All Khaled Said Facebook page initiated the call for
demonstrations on January 25 to protest police repression and human rights violations
(Rushdy 2012). Wael Ghonim, a Google executive, living in Dubai at the time, created
the page in response to the June 6, 2010 murder of the 28-year-old Alexandria man,
Khaled Said. Two corrupt local police officers tortured Said to death in front of a
cybercafé because he shot and posted a video of them conducting a drug deal on social
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media (Ghonim 2012; Faris 2013). The spread of a photo of Said’s mutilated face
right next to one of his handsome face before the attack on social media sites and
oppositional newspapers created a strong backlash. The picture especially
resonated with educated young middle-class Egyptians who identified with Said’s
similar background (Faris 2013).
Although Said’s death was the trigger, the Egyptian uprising was not
spontaneous (Shahin 2012). The uprising resulted from years of online and offline
organizing and mobilization that started in the mid-1990s. Since then, Egyptian
bloggers have been creating virtual communities of politically engaged citizens
who became active online and have participated, to a lesser extent, in street
protests (Faris 2013; El-Nawawy & Khamis 2014). Those opposed to Mubarak’s
regime used the “online political sphere” to create a “shared sense of awareness”
and build an “imagined community” of politicized citizens on social media
websites (Barrons 2012: 57; Tufekci & Wilson 2012: 364). Movements with
strong online presence such as Kefaya and the April 6 Youth movement also
helped in the politicization process (Faris 2013). Many activists from these
movements became leaders of the January 25 uprising (Wall & El Zahed 2011).
January 25 was a popular mass uprising (Ghonim 2012; Holmes 2012; Rushdy
2012; Tufekci & Wilson 2012; Masoud 2014). Most of the protestors at the onset of the
non-violent campaign were social media users, upper-middle-class, highly educated,
professionals, “educated unemployables,” or college students (Masoud 2014).
Subsequent participants, however, were of lower socioeconomic background (Holmes
2012). Social media was popular among protestors. More than half of them used
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Facebook to communicate about the protests, and Twitter users were more likely than
non-members to have participated in the first day of the uprising (Tufekci & Wilson
2012).
Women of all ages, socioeconomic statuses, and religious backgrounds had a
noticeable presence in the protests. They made up between 20-50 percent of
demonstrators. About sixty percent of female dissenters used Facebook to communicate
about the protests, twelve percent more than men (Khamis 2011; Tufekci & Wilson
2012).
Social media forums facilitated the recruitment process. I argue that social media
was especially mobilizing for women in Egypt, a gender-restrictive society. Because
women in Egypt were subjected to extreme forms of state and non-state repression, they
did not have easy access to traditional strong face-to-face political ties that people usually
develop in schools, religious institutions such as mosques, sports organizations such as
the ultra-soccer fan clubs, or even in the streets. Social media acted as a politicizing free
space for Egyptian women. Social media allowed women access to information and
political actors who were not readily available to them in their daily lives. It was also a
place where women were able to articulate their grievances.12 As such, I expect that the
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Of course, there are incidents of online harassment or bullying on social media.
However, I contend that these incidents are not severe enough to deter women from using
these forums for many reasons. First, such incidents could empower women by allowing
them to defend themselves against their harassers. Online, women can talk back to men,
and they can defend themselves under the veil of anonymity. Second, in politically
oriented pages, social media users defend each other against trolls. I believe that this
support increases the sense of community among participants in these pages. Finally,
social media users can block and report bullies. This is also another empowering
experience. In face-to-face encounters with harassers, women might feel helpless and
unable to stop the attack. However, online, they have the power to stop bullies by
blocking and reporting them.
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effect of online political networks on protest participation in the Egyptian uprising of
2011 would be more pronounced for women than men.
DATA AND METHODS
My data come from an Egyptian probability survey that was conducted from June
17 to June 30, 2011. The survey was a part of the larger Second Wave of the Arab
Democracy Barometer project, administered in eleven Arab countries beginning in 2010.
The survey resulted from a partnership between the University of Michigan, Princeton
University, and universities as well as research centers in the Arab world. The
Egyptian organization Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, an
independent and privately funded entity, completed the face-to-face interviews in
Arabic. The Egyptian survey is a representative sample of 1,219 citizens eighteen
years and older selected from 120 residential sites across 21 governorates. The
sample was drawn based on information from the official 2006 Egyptian census
that had been updated in 2010 with the CAPMPAS Household Income,
Expenditure, and Consumption survey. The data are weighted to account for the
unequal probability of household selection.
The survey is well suited to study the gendered effect of online political
networks. It is a sample of both activists and non-activists collected five months
after the uprising. The survey date is close enough to the protests to ensure that
the respondents’ recollections of their actions during the 18-day event should be
accurate. The questionnaire also has a detailed set of questions about the
respondents’ participation in the uprising, their online activities, and a host of
variables that might affect women’s protest participation and/or access to the
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internet such as socioeconomic status, age, place of residence, and adoption of Western
feminist ideology.
I excluded respondents who reported that they were pro-Mubarak during the 18day uprising because they were not a part of the pool of possible recruits. To identify proMubarak Egyptians, I used the question, “During the protests in Egypt between January
25 and February 11, was your position closer to supporters of former President Hosni
Mubarak, opposition against President Hosni Mubarak, or neither side?” I kept those who
were supporting neither side, those who did not know which side they supported, and
respondents who claimed to have been in opposition to Mubarak during the 18-day
campaign.13 This approach brought my sample size down from 1,219 to 1,048
respondents. I also dropped from the analysis respondents who had missing values on any
of my variables. My final sample size was 1,019 people, the unit of analysis.
Dependent variable. Protest participation is indicated by whether the respondent
participated “in the protests against former President Hosni Mubarak between January 25
and February 11, 2011?” (1 = yes, 0 = no). These dates marked the beginning of the
uprising and the day Mubarak stepped down. About nine percent of my respondents
protested.
As shown in Figure 3, 22.4 percent of the protestors were women. Also, 4.3
percent of the female respondents protested. These percentages suggest that about two
million Egyptian women joined the insurgency in 2011. Because of the high percentage
of female protestors, it is especially important to understand what motivated this large
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Results do not change when I include the entire sample. However, I prefer to exclude
the pro-Mubarak respondents because of the theoretical reasons mentioned above.
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percentage of women to participate in such high-risk movement. The percentage
of Egyptian women who joined the uprising, for instance, is higher than the
percentage of American women who joined the much lower risk anti-Trump
Women’s March on Washington in 2017. About 4.5 million American women
and men protested (Berry & Chenoweth 2018), which is equivalent to 1.4 percent
of the American resident population at the time (US Census 2018). This
exceptionally high rate and raw number of female protestors in the Egyptian
uprising suggests that women were successfully mobilized to join the high-risk
campaign. I aim to understand the successful recruitment efforts.
Figure 3. Percentage of women among protestors

22.4%

77.6%

Men

Women

Independent variables. I constructed the measure of online political
networks based on two criteria. First, to establish that respondents were active
users of social media forums, respondents were asked if they were “members of
or participants in” any internet network such as having a Facebook account,
Twitter account, a personal blog, or a dialogue board or group (1=yes, 0
=otherwise). Second, to ensure that respondents were using the internet for
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explicitly political rather than purely social reasons, respondents who were active users
of the internet also had to report that they used the internet to find out about political
activities, opposing political opinions, or to express opinions about political issues. Based
on responses to these questions, I coded respondents who reported being members of
online forums and who used the internet for political reasons as 1, 0 otherwise. About
eleven percent of respondents were members of online political networks, suggesting that
social media could have been successfully used to mobilize people. Figure 4 shows social
media membership and online political networks by gender. As expected, Egyptian
women had less access to social media than men. Social media was considered a resource
at the time of the uprising because people needed to invest in a computer or a smart-hone
and pay for internet services to be able to use it. As such, women had less of it. About 6.5
percent of female respondents had access to social media compared to over seventeen
percent of male respondents.
Figure 4. Social media membership and online political networking by gender
17.2%
14.8%

6.5%

6.3%

Social Media Membership

On-line Political Networks Membership
Men

Women

The majority of Egyptians who had access to social media during the uprising
used it for political purposes (about 89 percent). However, women were more likely than
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men to use it for political networking (97 percent vs. 86 percent). These results
agree with my argument that despite having less access to the internet, women
were more politically influenced by social media than men. To account for the
respondent’s gender, I coded women 1, men 0.
Control variables. I incorporated twenty-one controls.14 It is well
established that having strong personal ties to activists increase protest
participation (McAdam 1986). This observation was also true during the Egyptian
uprising (Dorsey 2012; Masoud 2014). I measured personal ties to protestors
using the question, “Did any of your friends or acquaintances participate in the
protests against former President Mubarak between January 25 and February 11?”
I coded people who had such ties as 1, 0 otherwise. Because organizational
involvement promotes activism (Morris 1984), including in the Egyptian case
(Dorsey 2012; Holmes 2012; Rizzo, Price & Meyer 2012), I used a dichotomous
variable that represented respondents’ membership in one or more organizations,
including charitable, youth, sports, and family/tribal association (1 =yes, 0 =no).
Because higher socioeconomic status facilitates protest participation (McCarthy &
Zald 1977), including in the Egyptian uprising (Holmes 2012), I controlled for
respondents’ income and education. I used four dummy variables to capture
monthly household income in Egyptian pounds (EGP): those who were at or
below the official Egyptian poverty line (Fakhry 2016) of 330 EGP (the omitted
category); 331-1,999 EGP; 2,000 EGP or above; and a category for those who did
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I provide weighted means of all of my variables for the whole sample, men, and
women in Appendix B.
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not disclose their income. Using this dummy variable approach allows me to avoid
estimating income for the eleven percent of respondents who refused to report their
income. I measured education using three dummy variables representing respondents
who were illiterate (the omitted category), those with some education but no bachelor’s
degree, and participants with a bachelor’s degree or above.
I controlled for Western feminist ideology to test whether online political ties
affect protest participation net of the effect of having a leaning towards Westernized
feminist ideals. I tested for this idea because some might claim that the internet effect is a
proxy for being upper-class or having a Westernized background. I agree with Allam
(2018) that Egyptian women participated in the uprising regardless of their stance on
feminism. Many of the female activists did not identify as feminists and claimed to be
against Western feminism (Allam 2018). I measured the adoption of Western feminist
ideology using a fourteen-item index where high scores indicated that the respondent was
a strong supporter of granting women more freedoms and rights. This included agreement
with statements such as “a woman can become the Prime Minister or President of a
Muslim state” or “women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men.” The
indicators form a reliable index (α = .79) ranging from 0 to 34.
The literature suggests that age affects protest participation (McAdam 1986).
Some scholars suggest that younger Egyptians were more likely to protest in general as
well as during the uprising (Dorsey 2012). I measured age using the question asking
about the respondent’s age and an age-squared variable. To account for biographical
availability, I coded those who were unemployed and thus had more time to protest as 1,
0 otherwise. Because people with familial responsibilities tend to protest less than those
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with no such time-consuming tasks (McAdam 1986), I coded people who were
married as 1, 0 otherwise. I measured religious affiliation, where I coded
Christians 1, Muslims 0. I expected Christian Egyptians to be less likely to protest
because of their minority status (Guirguis 2012).
Cairo was the epicenter of the Egyptian uprising (Ghonim 2012; Faris
2013), and I, therefore, took into consideration the place of residence using five
dummy variables. These variables represented Cairo Province (the governorates
of Cairo, Giza, and Qaliubiya; the omitted category); Alexandria Province
(Alexandria and Beheira); Canal Province (Port Said, Suez, Eastern, and
Ismailia); Delta Province (Damietta, Dakahlia, Kafr el-Sheikh, Western, and
Menoufia); and the Upper-Egypt Provinces (Beni Suef, Fayoum, Minya, Assiut,
Sohag, Qena, and Aswan). I also controlled for urban residence (=1) because the
uprising took place mainly in urban areas around the country (Ghonim 2012; Faris
2013).
Analytic strategy. I used logistic regression because protest is a
dichotomous variable. I reported metric coefficients, which indicate that for a unit
change in the predictor variable, the log-odds of protest changes by its respective
parameter estimate holding constant all other variables. I used Average Marginal
Effects (AME) to calculate predicted probabilities and changes in probabilities for
my models. No bivariate correlation exceeded .46, and no variable had a variation
inflation factor score above 1.47. I used Stata 13 to estimate my models.
RESULTS
Table 3 predicts protest participation in the 18-day Egyptian uprising of 2011.
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Table 3. Weighted logistic regression of protest participation on online networks, gender,
and controls (n=1019)
Model 1
b
SE
Independent variables
On-line political networks
a

Female

On-line networks x Female
Networks controls
Face-to-face networks
Organizational involvement
Class controls
b
Middle income
b

High income

Missing incomeb
High school or less

c

c

Bachelors or higher

Western feminist ideology
Demographic controls
Age
Age squared
Unemployed
Married
Religious affiliation
d
Christian Egyptian
Regional controls
e
Alexandria province
e

Canal province

e

Delta province

Upper Egypt provinces
f

Urban

Constant
F-Statistic

e

Model 2
b
SE

0.252
-0.361
-1.114 **
0.340
--

-0.088
0.403
-1.465 **
0.401
1.439 *
0.686

2.602 **
0.359
0.823 *
0.376

2.656 **
0.367
0.912 *
0.376

-0.362
0.514
-0.886
0.618
-0.408
0.608
0.620
0.458
1.061 *
0.513
-0.026
0.024

-0.411
0.512
-0.993
0.625
-0.525
0.619
0.623
0.472
0.960 †
0.537
-0.030
0.024

0.196 *
0.083
-0.002 *
0.001
-0.450
0.535
-0.855 *
0.428

0.204 *
0.083
-0.002 *
0.001
-0.501
0.525
-0.940 *
0.436

-0.441
0.615

-0.544
0.649

-0.724
0.453
-0.861
0.435
-1.095
0.464
-0.883
0.457
-0.097
0.323
-5.713
1.603
7.81

-0.812
0.457
-0.937
0.445
-1.123
0.478
-0.900
0.449
-0.076
0.330
-5.629
1.588
7.16
c

*
*
†

**
**

†
*
*
*

**
**

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category low income; reference category
illiterate; d reference category Muslim; e reference category Cairo; f reference category
rural; † p < .075; * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)

Protest Probability
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Model 1 is the baseline model. It shows that online political networks had no
significant effect on protest participation in general. However, this is not my focus. I aim
to uncover if the effect of online political networking is moderated by gender. Model 2
tests this by adding the product term online networks * female. The product term is
significant, and Figure 5 presents this interaction graphically. The two slopes shown
correspond to the effect of online political networks on protest participation for Egyptian
women and men. For women, holding all variables in the model constant, online political
networks almost tripled the probability of protest participation, raising it from 4 percent
to 11 percent. Social media did not have the same effect on men. The probability of
protest participation stayed similar for male respondents (around 11 percent) regardless
of their online political networking.
Figure 5. Predicted effect of online political engagement on the likelihood of
participation in the Egyptian uprising of 2011 by gender
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The results indicate that Egyptian women were less likely to join the street
protests absent the social media effect. Model 1 suggests that by showing that women
were less likely to protest than men. The predicted probability of protest for women was
less than half that of men (5.2 percent vs. 11.5 percent). However, women who were
politically engaged on social media had an equal probability of protest compared to men
who were also politically engaged on social media, about 11 percent.
In terms of controls, most of the established correlates of high-risk protest
participation worked as expected. Model 2 suggests that respondents who had face-toface connections to other activists were over 900 percent more likely to join the uprising
than those who did not have such ties (20 percent vs. 2.2 percent). Organizational
membership almost doubled the probability of protest participation (14.3 percent vs. 8
percent). There was an inverted-U curvilinear relationship between age and protest
participation. People in their early thirties were most likely to protest. Married
respondents were less likely to protest than those who were not married. Also, residents
of all provinces were less likely to protest than Cairo residents. Education had some
positive effect on protest participation, but it is only significant at the .075 level. Having a
Westernized feminist ideology did not affect participation in the street protests during the
18-day event significantly.
DISCUSSION
My results establish that Egyptian women were less likely than men to take part in
the 18-day high-risk non-violent campaign absent the social media effect. These results
reveal that social media was a valuable recruitment tool for women. Using social media
for political networking succeeded in politicizing women. And, they became as likely as
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men to join the 18-day event.
The gender gap in participating in the uprising, presented in Model 1, was
expected. As mentioned previously, Egyptian women are subjected to both state and nonstate repression that limits their safe and uncensored access to public spaces. My results
show evidence of the negative effect of the threatening, intimidating, hostile, degrading,
and humiliating gender-restrictive context on women’s access to face-to-face political
networks. Female respondents were significantly less likely than their male counterparts
to have access to the public sphere or membership in politicizing networks, which are
known to enhance mobilization in high-risk contexts (McAdam 1986). Figure 6 shows
that women were less likely than men to be members of formal or quasi-formal
organizations (3.6 percent vs. 11 percent), to be attending college at the time of the
uprising (2.8 percent vs. 5.3 percent), or to be working outside of the home (15.9 percent
vs. 76.4 percent). Among the 95.2 percent of my sample who were Muslims, women
were less likely than men to go to the mosque (14.7 percent vs. 28.5 percent). These
results suggest that a typical Egyptian woman was generally excluded from face-to-face
politicizing networks that are essential recruitment tools.
Figure 6. Percentage of face-to-face politicizing networks membership by gender
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Because of the relative political isolation of Egyptian women, I contend, they
turned to social media for an opportunity to be a part of its virtual political communities
and to participate in the public debates. This trend caused the gendered effect of online
political networks on protest participation. Before and during the 2011 uprising,
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube mobilized Egyptian women by providing a muchneeded gathering space where they became politically engaged through online
networking with other Egyptian citizens (Salmon, Fernandez & Post 2010; Khamis &
Vaughn 2011; Ghonim 2012; Radsch 2012; Radsch & Khamis 2013; El-Nawawy &
Khamis 2014; Allam 2018).
Hundreds of Twitter accounts and Facebook pages mobilized Egyptian women
during that period. However, the “We Are All Khaled Said” page was one of the more
influential forums. Recall, this is the page that initiated the call for protest on January 25,
2011 (Ghonim 2012; Allam 2018). In addition, the page was especially popular among
Egyptians. It had more than seven million daily views on January 22, 2011, three days
before the uprising.15 Because of that, I will use few of the thousands of posts and
comments on We Are All Khaled Said page to illustrate some of the ways that Egyptian
women utilized social media forums to find information about political issues and protest
activities, connect to anti-regime activists, and share their own political views and
experiences.
Finding information about political events. Assuming that many Egyptians would
be protesting for the first time on January 25, 2011, We Are All Khaled Said page posted

We Are All Khaled Said’s Facebook page, accessed November 28, 2018 (https://www.
facebook.com/ElShaheeed/photos/a.104265636289976/159901180726421/?type=3&the
ater).
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clear guidelines on the logistics of protest. For instance, on January 23, 2011, at 11:54
am, the page shared a post entitled “Instructions for Protesting” that included instructions
on how protestors should behave during the uprising. In the post, the page urged
protestors to remain peaceful. It encouraged potential demonstrators to refrain from
engaging in unlawful acts, using inappropriate language, hurting bystanders, or
vandalizing property. The post advised first-time protestors to avoid being in the
frontlines of the marches where security forces might harm them. In terms of logistics,
the post urged protestors to be on-time because showing-up in large numbers would make
it harder for the security forces to disperse the protestors. Participants also were
instructed to leave all valuables and important papers except identification cards at home,
to wear comfortable clothes, and to carry a large bottle of water.16 The page periodically
posted designated phone numbers to call for information about the times and places of
protests in the different Egyptian governorates. Moreover, on January 26, 2011, at 7:27
am, when the Egyptian government tried unsuccessfully at the time to block Facebook,
the page posted a way around this blockage. The post included detailed instructions to
help protestors access their Facebook accounts.17
Finding out about anti-regime figures and ideas. We Are All Khaled Said page
acquired millions of members in the months leading to the uprising. The significant
number of likes, shares, and comments on the page gave Egyptian women the impression
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that there was an extremely popular movement against the regime and its infamous
security apparatus. For example, on January 22, 2011, at 6:37 pm, “We Are All Khaled
Said” page posted a photograph of the daily page statistics that showed that there were
2,615 daily new members, 7,132,775 daily post views, and 50,153 daily post feedback
comments. The caption claimed that the page already recruited enough people for the
protests to be successful, and that there will be a huge number of demonstrators in the
street on January 25.18 During the uprising, the page highlighted female dissenters’ heroic
acts and encouraged other women to join the movement like their courageous sisters. For
instance, on February 6, 2011, at 4:55 pm, the page posted a picture of eleven martyrs of
the uprising that was still ongoing at the time. The martyrs included a woman in her
twenties, Sally Zahran, who was beaten to death by pro-regime thugs while trying to
reach a protest site.19
The page also informed members about their anti-regime agenda. For example, on
January 24, 2011, at 2:00 am, the page posted a list of four demands that they asked
potential protestors to adopt. The demands were to a) eradicate extreme poverty; b) end
the Emergency Law; c) oust the head of the Ministry of Interior; d) limit each President
to two consecutive terms in office.20 Another post was a drawing that included the word
“why [protest]?” in the middle, and an extensive list of grievances such as the
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deteriorating health care system, the failing education system, the lack of the rule of law,
and the rampant corruption among government employees.21
Expressing opinions about political issues. We Are All Khaled Said page was
also a place for women to join the public conversation, express their opinions, and share
their experiences as protestors. On January 22, 2011, at 4:14 pm, a Christian Egyptian
woman posted a picture of herself wearing a cross and holding a sign that read “my faith:
Christian; my nationality: Egyptian; I am joining January 25 to avenge my country,
Egypt.” This post refers to the ongoing targeting of Christian churches by terrorists, the
latest incident at the time was the bombing of a church in Alexandria on December 31,
2010, during the New Year’s Eve mass.22 Because Facebook is an interactive forum,
women had the opportunity to express their feelings and share their grievances by liking,
sharing, and commenting on posts. For example, on Wednesday, January 26, 2011, at
8:42 pm, the page posted a call for protests on January 28, 2011, which is known as the
Friday of Anger. The post read, “join the protests, don’t just watch, create your history
with your own hands.” Many women used the comment section to express their reasons
for protesting, voice their frustration with some incidents of sexual harassment from onlookers during the first two days of the uprising, express gratitude towards male
protestors who tried to protect them from the pro-Mubarak thugs, and encourage other
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women and men to join the demonstrations.23
These few examples illustrate several of the online political activities that some
women participated in both before and during the uprising. It is likely that women who
did not even comment, like, or share these posts but were able to read them were
politicized by their content. Membership in a community of activists could result from
observing these activists interact with each other without being a part of the interactions.
For that reason, estimates of the number of women who were politicized through their
membership in online forums, which is based, in part, on the number of female
interactions with the content, might be more conservative than the actual numbers.
Online networks had no effect on protest participation among male respondents
because men had access to other networks. In a supplemental analysis, presented in
Figure 7, I found that a mere 3.1 percent of male respondents who had access to online
political networks had no other networking opportunities such as organizational
membership, attending school, working outside the home, or going to the mosque. This
percentage reaches a staggering 33.6 percent among Egyptian women. This means that
about one of every three Egyptian women who had access to social media at that time had
no access to any other forms of politicizing networks. Men, however, had the opportunity
to be members of face-to-face politicizing networks. Only three of every one-hundred
Egyptian men did not have access to such ties. I contend that the weak ties of social
media become less important in the presence of strong face-to-face ties. However, in their
absence, even weak online ties become crucial for the mobilization process.
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Figure 7. Percentage of members of online political networks with no access to face-toface networks by gender
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Could the effect of online networks be a proxy for other variables such as
socioeconomic status, urban residence, or Westernized ideology? My results indicate that
online political networks had a positive effect on protest participation among women, net
of all control variables in the model. In a supplemental analysis, I tested if the effect of
education, income, urban residence, or pro-Western ideology on mobilization is gendered
and found no statistical support for these claims. I also found that among female
respondents, protestors were not more likely than non-protestors to have a “Western”
feminist ideology. These results agree with Allam’s (2018) point that most female
protestors did not adopt a “Western” feminist ideology. Social media politicized Egyptian
women not because it exposed them to Western ideology, but because it exposed them to
each other, and to Egyptian politicizing networks.
CONCLUSION
The role of social media as a recruitment tool during the Arab Spring generally,
and the Egyptian uprising in particular, have been widely debated. Regarding Egypt, the
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debate centered on whether the uprising was a “Facebook-driven campaign” or not. I add
to the literature by taking this debate a step further. I encourage scholars to consider the
social location of the actors when thinking about the effect of social media on recruitment
to high-risk movements. In gender-restrictive societies, most, if not all, recruitment tools
are gendered. The effect of social media forums should be gendered because women have
less access to politicizing networks that form in the public spaces such as universities,
work, organizations, mosques, or even in the streets and coffee houses. When women
gain access to online politicizing networks, they use these forums to mobilize each other.
My work also pushes scholars to reject the orientalist dichotomy of Arab, and
Egyptian, women as either oppressed non-activists or “Westernized” feminists. I believe
that Egyptian women used social media to communicate with other Egyptians. As my
results suggest, adopting a Western feminist ideology was not associated with a higher
probability of protest participation. However, having access to online politicizing
networks increased mobilization. These results highlight the agency of Egyptian women.
Female activists used social media as a free space to politicize themselves and other
women through their articulation of their own experiences as Egyptian women, having
access to unconventional Egyptian actors, and finding alternative Egyptian sources of
information. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube did not politicize by spreading Western
ideology among Egyptian women. Instead, social media politicized by allowing increased
and safe access to other Egyptian actors and ideas.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FAILED NON-VIOLENT ANTI-REGIME CAMPAIGNS AND
CHANGES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND OPINIONS
The ultimate goal of many non-violent anti-regime movements in autocratic
societies is to transition to and maintain efficient democratic systems (Chenoweth &
Stephan 2011). Consequently, scholars became increasingly interested in the period that
immediately follows the ousting of a dictator – the transitional period. “Transitologists”
mainly concentrate on the factors that facilitate the process of transitioning from an
authoritarian political system into a stable and functioning democracy (Barrie & Ketchley
2018; Kadivar 2018; Kadivar & Ketchley 2018; Ketchley & El-Rayyes 2019; Pinckney
2020). Unfortunately, this body of research does not sufficiently track the effect of the
democratization process on political participation and opinions among citizens.
I aim to add to the literature by arguing that during transitional periods citizens
become more politically involved, but their support of Western democratic ideals could
diminish. These effects, of course, may vary based on social location, prior activism, and
the political context. Anti-regime campaigns that successfully remove a sitting head of
state increase political participation because they increase the general sense of threat and
insecurity that political polarization and uncertainty might cause. After decades of
extreme repression and lack of political change, many individuals become uncertain and
fearful when a non-violent campaign removes the autocratic leader who had absolute
power over the political scene for so long. Citizens feel threatened, especially if there is
no clear charismatic leader(s) in sight (Zgurić 2012). In such circumstances, citizens
might feel that they are responsible for stabilizing the country. I contend that this sense of
fear could increase protest participation during transitional periods. Citizens, however,
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might be less willing to adopt Western democratic principles during these periods of
political ambiguity. People who suffer during transitions might think that Western
democratic ideals are not living up to their promise. Remember, these could be periods of
political chaos, repression, human rights violations, economic downturn, lack of security,
and shortage of basic necessities.
In this chapter, I track the shifts in political participation and public support of
democracy before, during, and after the transitional period that followed the ousting of
the Egyptian dictator, Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, in 2011. Egypt is a particularly
suitable case study because it underwent a rocky transition that included multiple phases
in the five years that followed the uprising. After the 18-day event that ended on February
11, Egypt experienced a somewhat successful democratic transition that resulted in the
free election of Mohamed Morsi in 2012. There was a remarkably continuous political
unrest throughout Morsi’s time in office. Eventually, a mass protest movement, Tamarod,
led to a military coup that removed Morsi on June 30, 2013. The transitional period
continued until 2014, when General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi was elected as Egypt’s sixth
President, marking the ultimate failure of the uprising (Bassiouni 2016; Ketchley 2017).
I utilize data from five sources to test my argument that transitional periods that
follow successful non-violent campaigns in autocratic contexts are marked by an increase
in political participation and declining support for democracy. I use the Fifth Wave of the
World Value Survey (WVSV; Inglehart et al. 2014); the Second, Third, and Fourth waves
of the Arab Democracy Barometer, collected in 2011, 2013, and 2016 respectively (ABII;
ABIII; ABIV); and the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al. 2012). My
study contributes to the literature by using the Egyptian case to investigate how some of
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the challenges that may occur at the individual level during transition periods that follow
non-violent anti-regime campaigns might affect citizens’ political opinions and
behaviors.
PRO-DEMOCRACY TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
Most social movements seek to create change. One particular type of movement is
the anti-regime non-violent campaigns in autocratic societies. Such campaigns are
generally subjected to extreme forms of repression because authoritarian regimes repress
social movements, especially those seeking regime change. Many such movements, about
47 percent, do not achieve their stated goals (Stephan & Chenoweth 2008; Chenoweth &
Stephan 2011). Of course, many successful anti-regime campaigns fail in resolving
“systemic governance problems, such as co-opted institutions, entrenched corruption, and
a lack of power-sharing between a regime's military or security forces and the civilian
bureaucracy” (Chenoweth & Stephan 2014: 98). For instance, among the countries that
were a part of the Arab Spring, only Tunisia succeeded in transitioning to democracy. In
Egypt, the young secular activists failed to effectively organize political parties or interest
groups to participate in governance during the transitional period. The Egyptian
military’s refusal to transfer power to the democratically elected President and its
repression of the January 25 activists led to the eventual failure of the uprising
(Chenoweth & Stephan 2014). Because of the importance of the transitional period to the
ultimate success or failure of non-violent anti-regime campaigns in authoritarian regimes,
many researchers devoted much of their scholarship to the study of this critical period
(Barrie & Ketchley 2018; Kadivar & Ketchley 2018; Ketchley & El-Rayyes 2019;
Pinckney 2020).
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Transitional periods are particularly important in the life of any successful nonviolent (unarmed) anti-regime campaign. It is the period that determines whether the
country would establish a functioning democratic political system or return to the
authoritarian regime (Chenoweth & Stephan 2014; Pinckney 2020). These periods are
also contexts in which citizens face extreme levels of uncertainty and political chaos. In
such settings, citizens might not have a clear understanding of the nature of democratic
regimes. Citizens also might not have a clear picture of their political environment. They
might turn to their own experiences as their source of information on what democracy
means and how to act within the new developments that are taking place in their
countries (Mattes & Bratton 2007; Meirowitz & Tucker 2013). Most transitologists
concentrate on two factors as determinants of a successful transition to democracy –
political participation and attitudes.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION DURING TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
Transitologists have looked extensively at protest activities during transitional
periods. Some scholars look at protest activities as the dependent variable. For example,
Barrie and Ketchley (2018) found that labor protest activities increase in transitional
periods when the number of other protest activities increases throughout the country. In
such contexts, when one group protests, it inspires other groups to join in and protest for
their own causes. Other scholars studied protest as the independent variable. For instance,
some scholars argue that ongoing protests alienate moderates during the transitional
periods and could result in failed transitions (Przeworski 1991; Linz & Stepan 1996)
while others believe that protests provide continuing pressure on members of the elites
and supporters of the old regime to prevent any counter-movements (Bermeo 1997;
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Collier 1999; Kadivar & Ketchley 2018). Some even went as far as arguing that violent
unarmed collective action might be beneficial to the democratization process. These
protests could raise the cost of governing for the new administration. They could also
mobilize other citizens who witness security forces repressing the unarmed protestors.
These protests might successfully direct more of the regime’s resources towards
controlling protestors instead of other, more significant, political battles (Kadivar &
Ketchley 2018). Others believe that high levels of mobilization and “redirecting the tools
of non-violent resistance” towards institutionalization at the same time might be the only
path to successful democratization (Pinckney 2020: 13).
Transitologists have found that voting turnout during the transitional period
mainly depends on citizens’ perception of the importance and fairness of the elections.
For instance, in the founding Palestinian elections that took place in January 1996, most
Palestinians viewed the process as a way to choose the leaders who would negotiate with
Israel. Most Palestinians voted because that election was especially important. However,
those who did not believe that the elections would be “free and fair” did not participate
(Ghanem 1996).
POLITICAL ATTITUDES DURING TRANSITIONAL PERIODS
The chaotic nature of the transitional period, including excessive protests and
counter-protests, could affect citizens’ political attitudes by intensifying their sense of
fear and lack of security. For instance, Ketchley and El-Rayyes (2019) found that,
following the Egyptian uprising of 2011, residents of districts that held regular protests
were less likely to favor democracy. This finding was especially noticeable in areas
where the protests controlled the public space and affected the daily activities of
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residents. Continued protests could also change attitudes towards protest activities
themselves. For instance, in Egypt, many shopkeepers and residents of Cairo started a
series of “anti-protest protests” in March 2011, less than two months after the ousting of
Mubarak. They claimed that protest activities were affecting their businesses, traffic, and,
most importantly, the economic recovery (Ketchley & El-Rayyes 2019: 8).
Not only do citizens endure street political action, but crime rates also increase
during transitional periods (Lafree & Tseloni 2006; Fox & Hoelscher 2012). The
breakdown of political institutions and decreased presence of security forces cause the
crime surge (Villarreal 2002; Grillo 2012; Trejo & Ley 2013). The sense of threat and
increase in crime rates during transitional periods usually lead to a high preference for a
strong authoritarian leader and decreased support for democracy among citizens (Abadeer
et al. 2019). This relationship between crime and political attitudes is well established
(Davis & Silver 2003; Bateson 2012; Roccato, Vieno & Russo 2014). Besides, fear of
extremists, such as Islamists in the case of Egypt, could lead to increased support for an
authoritarian ruler who can restore the people’s sense of stability (Hatab 2019).
Reading this innovative and impressive body of literature, I find that two
questions need further investigation. First, how do the political participation and opinions
of citizens evolve throughout an entire transitional period that starts with an initial
democratic breakthrough and ends with a failure to democratize? Second, how does the
biography of the actor, such as prior activism, or the social location of that individual,
such as gender, affect political participation and opinions?
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD CHALLENGES
Transitional periods, in general, are challenging times. The social and political
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norms change during these chaotic periods. In many cases, the transitional periods
challenges affect the behaviors and opinions of citizens. The literature documented some
of these challenges. One of the main challenges of the transitional period is how to deal
with transitional justice. This concept refers to “political decisions […] directed towards
individuals on the basis of what they did or what was done to them under the earlier
regime” (Elster 1998:14). The ability to address transitional justice depends on many
factors such as the political strength of the old regime supporters, whether the army is
still loyal to the old regime, the strength of the oppositional parties, and who controls the
repressive capacity during the transitional period (De Brito, Enríquez & Aguilar 2001).
To achieve transitional justice, the criminal justice system and the interim government
must hold members of the old regime and its apparatus accountable. This might be hard
to do when these institutions still include many of the old regime’s sympathizers
(Karstedt & LaFree 2006). In the case of Egypt, corruption was one of the main
grievances that caused the uprising. As such, some argued that corruption should have
also been added to the issues addressed by transitional justice (Andrieu 2012). Findings
on the effect of transitional justice on institutions and policy at the state-level are mixed
(Thoms, Ron & Paris 2010).
Another challenge of the transitional period is the “inherited authoritarian political
culture” of the citizens. For instance, in many cases, transitional period elections are not
necessarily a way for the newly liberated citizens to express their political preferences.
Instead, the ballot box is sometimes used as a way to create, and legitimize, a new
authoritarian regime. Citizens participate in these pseudo free elections because, in many
cases, they do not embrace true democratic ideology (Gudina 2011).

88
The lack of a sense of security is another challenge faced by citizens during
transitional periods. It is well established that crime increases during a transitional period.
An increase in crime causes citizens to lose trust in society and social institutions (LaFree
1998). Crime also increases the rift between the rich and the poor. Because wealthy
individuals could afford to escape high-crime areas by hiding in their secured gated
communities, they become more separated from the poor. This separation causes the poor
to resent the rich and the rich to fear the poor. In addition, the increase in crime waves
during the transitional period could cause citizens to characterize democracy as weak and
unable to provide the needed security. In that case, citizens might be persuaded to re-elect
the old regime in an attempt to restore order (Karstedt & LaFree 2006).
The criminal justice system itself affects citizens’ support for democratization. In
autocratic societies, the government is not separated from the criminal justice system.
Instead, both of these institutions work together to control the citizens completely.
Because of that, one of the most important challenges of the transitional period is to
democratize the criminal justice system, which includes the police forces and the courts.
When citizens regain their trust in these institutions, the democratization process has a
better chance of success (Karstedt & LaFree 2006).
Citizens’ sense of collective efficacy is also crucial for a successful transition.
Both support for democratization and political participation are positively associated with
collective efficacy, which Lee (2006) defines as a citizen’s belief that the public as a
collective actor could successfully create political and social change.
All these challenges were relevant in the case of the Egyptian uprising. For
instance, after the ousting of Mubarak, SCAF had a complete monopoly over the state.
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They also had absolute control of the country’s repressive apparatus. Because of that,
Egypt did not get much transitional justice. Mubarak went on trial, but he was treated as a
President during his trial, unlike Morsi, for instance, who stayed in prison while being
prosecuted by the el-Sisi regime. Egypt also had an inherited authoritarian political
culture. Starting with the March 2011, referendum, we see that the religious leaders and
SCAF easily manipulated the Egyptian voters. Moreover, Egyptians did not trust the
criminal justice system during the transitional period, and the increased wave of crime
shook their sense of security during that time.
What is missing from the literature is the effect of the transitional period and the
challenges that people face during such a period on individuals’ political participation
and opinion. I contend that such challenges increase political participation but decrease
support for democracy. It increases political participation out of a sense of necessity. As
Azab and Santoro (2017) argue, fear could increase protest participation. After the
uprising, Egyptians felt the need to protest and vote because they were afraid of the chaos
and uncertainty that is typical of transitional periods. Egyptians, however, were blaming
democracy for creating that chaos and uncertainty.
DATA AND METHODS
I used four individual-level data sources to assess political participation and views
between 2008 and 2016. In addition, I utilized one database of incidents of social conflict
in Egypt between 2005 and 2016. I chose 2008 as my starting point for the micro-level
data because it was three years before the 2011 uprising. This time gap is important
because the survey captured a political moment that was distinct from 2011, but it was
close enough to still be relevant. For instance, in 2008, the Kefaya movement was already
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established and had a noticeable presence on the internet. Also, the April 6 Youth
movement was created in that year (Clarke 2011; Singerman 2013). I chose 2016 as my
endpoint because scholars agree that five-years after the peak of a non-violent campaign
is a suitable time to evaluate the long-term success of that movement (Chenoweth &
Stephan 2011). Following commonly practiced data collection procedures in Egypt, my
four surveys did not include the five frontier governorates of Matrouh, North Sinai, South
Sinai, New Valley, and Red Sea for security reasons, excluding less than two percent of
the total Egyptian population (Barssoum 2007; Pew Research Center 2014).
World Value Survey, Fifth Wave (WVSV). The data were collected between March
3, 2008, and May 4, 2008, in Egypt. The survey used the 2006 census to create the
sampling frame. It divided Egypt’s governorates into 480 segments, based on their share
of the population, each containing about 100 households. Surveyors randomly chose 66
rural and 56 urban segments. Finally, they chose about 25 households from each segment.
Data collectors interviewed the head of the household, if available; if not, they randomly
selected an individual above the age of eighteen. The survey also formed an alternative
sample in each segment to use in case there was no one to answer the survey in the
chosen households. Only 3.3 percent of the final sample came from the alternative
sample. All interviews were conducted face-to-face in Arabic, and the responses were
then translated into English. The final sample included 3,051 individuals, the unit of
analysis. I excluded cases with missing values on any of my variables, bringing my
sample size to 3,042 Egyptians. I weighted my data to account for the unequal gender
distribution.
Arab Democracy Barometer (AB). I used the Arab Democracy Barometer Survey
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Waves Two (ABII), Three (ABIII), and Four (ABIV). The Arab Democracy Barometer
project resulted from a partnership between the University of Michigan and Princeton
University in the United States, and different research centers in 14 Arab countries. AlAhram Center for Political and Strategic Studies conducted the Egyptian part of the ABII
survey in June of 2011. The survey was a representative sample of 1,219 Egyptians
eighteen years and older. It took place face-to-face in Arabic. I excluded cases with
missing values on any of my variables, bringing my sample size to 1,202 Egyptians. I
weighted my data to account for household selection. The research center, MADA
Foundation for Media Development, conducted an Egyptian survey between March 31
and April 7, 2013, as a part of the ABIII. The survey included 1,196 individuals over
eighteen years old who were interviewed face-to-face in Arabic. I used all cases because
there were no missing data. I weighted the data for the probability of selection, in
addition to post-stratification weight by age and gender. The fieldwork for the Egyptian
part of the ABIV took place between April 15 and 23, 2016, a little over five years after
the uprising. The Egyptian Research and Training Center conducted the paper-and-pencil
face-to-face interviews in Arabic. The survey was a representative sample of 1,200
Egyptians eighteen years and over. I included all the cases in my analysis. I weighted the
data to account for the probability of selection.
Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) Version 3.3. I used this database to
document macro-level instances of social and political disorder in Egypt. I coded events
such as protests, riots, strikes, terrorist attacks, sectarian violence, and police raids. The
data collection took place at the University of North Texas and the University of Denver
using Lexis Nexis search engine. Some “events” in the data lasted more than one day or
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took place in more than one Egyptian city. For instance, the data coded the 18-day
Egyptian uprising of 2011 as one event that occurred in many cities and lasted for
eighteen days. I used the events recorded between 2005 when anti-regime movements
such as Kefaya started to appear, and 2016, five years after the uprising. My sample size
is 1,508 events. The information is crucial to understanding why political opinion and
participation among Egyptians changed over time. I contend that all events of social and
political unrest, including both violent incidents and non-violent protests, contributed to
people’s political actions and opinions.
Analytic strategy. I used logistic regression for all my statistical models because
my dependent variables are dichotomous. I reported metric coefficients, which indicate
that for a unit change in the predictor variable, the log-odds of the dependent changes by
its respective parameter estimate, holding constant all other variables. I used Average
Marginal Effects (AME) to calculate predicted probabilities and changes in probabilities
for my models. No bivariate correlation in any of my models exceeded .38, and no
variable had a variation inflation factor score above 1.42. I used Stata 13 to estimate my
models.
Dependent variables. I used three dependent variables to measure respondents’
political participation and opinions. Protest participation and voting in the parliamentary
elections were my measures of political participation. I measured political opinions using
variables that assess pro-democracy views. All three questions were asked in each of my
four surveys using similar wording.
Protest participation. My protest participation variables were dichotomous,
representing whether the respondent participated in non-violent action. In the WVS 2008,
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the question asked whether the respondent has attended, might attend, or “would never
under any circumstances attend peaceful demonstrations.” I coded those to reported that
they “have done it” as 1, 0 otherwise. I assigned a score of 1 to respondents who reported
that they “participated in the protests after Mubarak ceded power” in the ABII survey,
and zero to all other respondents. I gave a score of 1 to those who reported that they
“participated in a protest, march or sit-in” in the past three years in the ABIII survey, 0
otherwise. In the ABIV survey, I assigned those who reported participating in a “protest,
march or sit-in” one or more times a score of 1, and zero to all other respondents.
Voting behavior. I measured voting behavior using dichotomous variables
representing whether the respondent voted in the “last parliamentary election,” from
WVS, ABIII, and ABIV. I coded those who voted as 1, 0 otherwise. The ABII question
asked, “will you vote in the next parliamentary elections?” I assigned a score of 1 to
those who answered yes, 0 otherwise.
Pro-democracy views. I used dichotomous variables to indicate whether
respondents viewed democracy favorably. I coded those who viewed “having a
democratic political system” as a “very good or fairly good way of governing [Egypt]” in
the WVS 2008 survey as 1, 0 otherwise. In the ABII and ABIII surveys, I coded as 1
those who believed that “a democratic political system [which means] public freedoms,
guarantees equality in political and civil rights, alternation of power, and accountability
and transparency of the executive authority” is good or very good “with regard to the
country’s governance.” All other respondents received a score of 0. I assigned a score of
1 to respondents who stated that, in their opinion, “democracy is always preferable to any
other kind of government” in the ABIV survey, 0 otherwise.
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Independent variables. To test whether an actor’s activist status and social
location affected her/his political participation and opinion, I included measures of
January 25 activism and gender.
January 25 activism. To measure whether the respondent was a “January 25
activist,” I used a question in the ABII that asks, “did you participate in the protests
against former President Hosni Mubarak between January 25 and February 11, 2011?”24 I
code those who answered yes as 1, 0 otherwise. In the ABIII, the question asked, “the
Arab Spring led some demonstrations and rallies in [Egypt]. Did you participate in any of
these events?” I assigned a value of 1 to those who indicated that they did, 0 otherwise.
The question was not asked in the ABIV.
Gender. Because Egypt is a gender-restrictive environment, where women lack
fundamental rights (Amnesty International 2015), I coded women as 1, men 0.
Control variables. I incorporated nine controls.25 Coptic Christian is a religious
minority group. As such, its members are likely to react differently than Muslims to
political changes. I coded Coptic Christians as 1, Muslims 0. Illiteracy is known to
negatively affect an individual’s social, economic, and political wellbeing, and illiterate
individuals in the Arab world are especially vulnerable (Abu Hammud & Jarrar 2017). I
measured the effect of being illiterate using three dummy variables representing
respondents who were illiterate (the omitted category), those with some education but no
bachelor’s degree, and participants who have a bachelor’s degree or above. Biographical

I use the term “January 25 activists” to describe those who participated in the 18-day
uprising to distinguish them from those who protested before or after the uprising. Also,
this is one of the terms that Egyptians use to describe participants of the uprising.
25
I provide weighted means for all variables for each of my four surveys in Appendix C.
24
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factors could affect a person’s political participation and opinion. I coded people who
were married as 1, 0 otherwise. I assigned those who were unemployed and thus had
more time for political participation a score of 1, 0 otherwise. I tracked age using the
survey question that asked about the respondent’s age. I took into consideration the place
of residence using one dichotomous variable representing Cairo province (=1), and
another to account for urban residence (=1).
RESULTS
In this chapter, I investigate how political participation and views changed
between 2008, three years before the January 25, 2011 uprising, and 2016, five years
after the non-violent campaign. I started by tracing general trends about political
participation and opinions during that period.
Figure 8 shows the change in protest activities over time. Only 1.4 percent of
Egyptians claimed that they had ever protested in 2008. This number almost doubles in
the five months that followed the 2011 uprising reaching 2.7 percent.
Figure 8. Protest participation between 2008 and 2016
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In 2013, 10.8 percent claimed that they had joined a demonstration or rally in the
past three years. This number decreased to 3.5 percent in 2016, which is 2.5 times the
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level of protest in 2008.
Figure 9 tracks voting behaviors. More than 31 percent of Egyptians claimed to
have voted in the last parliamentary elections in 2008. After the uprising, more than four
in five Egyptians (83.3 percent) were planning to vote in the next elections. In 2013, over
two in three (69.3 percent) reported voting in the last election. This number declined to a
little more than half (52.5 percent) in 2016, about 1.7 times the level of participation in
2008.
Figure 9. Voting behavior between 2008 and 2016
83.3%
69.3%
52.5%
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Figure 10 shows that pro-democracy sentiment was highest in 2008, three years
before the uprising. A staggering 97.4 percent of Egyptians believed that having a
democratic political system is a very good or fairly good way to govern the country. This
percent decreased slightly after the uprising, with almost ninety-five percent declaring
that a democratic political system is a good or very good way to govern the country. A
little over three in four Egyptians, about seventy-six percent, viewed democracy that way
in 2013. This percentage was even lower in 2016, where slightly over half of the
population (53.8 percent) reported pro-democracy opinions.
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Figure 10. Pro-democracy views between 2008 and 2016
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Next, I examined the correlates of political participation and opinions during these
four different points in the Egyptian history. Table 4 illustrates the logistic regression of
political participation and attitudes in 2008.26 Model 1 established that women were less
likely to protest than men, although the results were not statistically significant. Model 2
showed that women were less likely to vote than men (20.36 percent vs. 48.17 percent).
Model 3 demonstrated that the gender effect on the probability of believing that having a
democratic political system is a very good or fairly good way to govern the country was
minimal (96.95 percent for women and 98.07 percent for men), and only significant at the
.1 level.
Control variables showed that education had a positive effect on political
participation. Being married increased the probability of voting, but decreased protest.
Unemployed and older individuals had a higher probability of voting than younger
26

I used a rare event model, firth logistic regression, for estimating post-Mubarak protest
participation because the number of positive cases is low (only 34 respondents reported
protesting after Mubarak ceded power). The results were almost identical to the results of
the binary logistic regression.

98
Egyptians and those who were employed. Finally, those who lived in Cairo and urban
residents were less likely to vote than other Egyptians.
Table 4. Logistic regression of political participation and opinions based on the 2008
WVS (n=3,042)
Model 1
Protest
b
SE
Minority status
a
Female
Coptic Christianb
High school or less

c

c

Bachelors or higher

Demgraphic controls
Married
Unemployed
Age
Regional controls
d
Cairo province
Urbane
Constant
F-Statistic

Model 2
Voting
b
SE

Model 3
Pro-Democracy
b
SE

-0.432
0.326
0.180
0.568
0.555
0.491
1.811 **
0.517

-1.408 **
0.094
-0.161
0.185
0.405 **
0.109
1.005 **
0.159

-0.470 †
0.268
1.636
1.008
0.124
0.258
0.305
0.479

-0.775 *
0.370
-0.241
0.682
-0.020
0.015

0.573 **
0.112
0.434 *
0.211
0.015 **
0.003

0.338
0.254
0.111
0.602
0.000
0.009

0.348
0.329
0.349
0.355
-3.811 **
0.780
6.33 **

-0.863
0.116
-0.861
0.100
-0.865
0.224
48.51
c

0.213
0.279
0.171
0.254
3.404 **
0.579
1.40

**
**
**
**

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category Muslim; reference category
illiterate; d reference category other provinces; e reference category rural; † p < .1; * p <
.05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
Table 5 represents the logistic regression of political participation and attitudes
among Egyptians in June 2011. Model 1 showed that January 25 activists were more
likely than non-participants to engage in non-violent protest after Mubarak’s resignation
(13.68 percent probability vs. 1.33 percent). Women were less likely to protest than men,
even though the results are not statistically significant. Model 2 illustrated that activists
were more likely than non-protestors to claim that they will vote in the next
parliamentary elections (92.6 percent vs. 82.85 percent), but the results were only
significant at the .075 level. The probability of planning to vote was lower for women
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than men (75.82 percent vs. 91.9 percent).
Table 5. Logistic regression of political participation and opinions based on the June
2011 ABII (n=1,202)
Model 1
Protest
b
SE
Uprising participation
Protested between Jan 25 & Feb 11, 2011
Minority status
a
Female
b

Coptic Christian

High school or less

c

c

Bachelors or higher

Demgraphic controls
Married
Unemployed
Age
Regional controls
Cairo provinced
e

Urban

Constant
F-Statistic
a

Model 2
Plans to Vote
b
SE

Model 3
Pro-Democracy
b
SE

2.543 **
0.453

1.019 †
0.558

0.188
0.766

-0.460
0.438
1.002
0.719
0.820
0.639
0.746
0.685

-1.326 **
0.193
-0.226
0.300
0.700 **
0.191
1.396 **
0.303

-1.196 **
0.318
-0.485
0.543
0.437
0.289
2.220 **
0.800

-0.284
0.408
0.481
0.753
0.001
0.015

-0.053
0.224
0.200
0.540
0.009
0.007

0.119
0.340
0.638
1.043
-0.015
0.010

0.263
0.477
0.833 †
0.459
-5.248 **
0.951
8.71 **

-0.155
0.222
-0.201
0.189
1.630 **
0.412
8.95 **
c

0.599
0.448
0.046
0.322
3.661 **
0.640
4.14 **

Notes: reference category male; b reference category Muslim; reference category
illiterate; d reference category other provinces; e reference category rural; † p < .1; * p <
.05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
Model 3 demonstrated that joining the 2011 uprising increased the probability of
viewing a democratic political system as a good or very good way of governance in the
country, but these results were not statistically significant. The probability was lower for
women (92.56 percent) than men (97.57 percent). In terms of control variables, education
seems to have a positive effect on voting and pro-democracy views.
Table 6 shows the logistic regression of political attitudes and participation
among Egyptians in 2013 during the presidency of Mohammed Morsi. Model 1 indicated
that January 25 activists were more likely than other citizens to have protested in the past
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three years. The probability of protest for activists was 36.64 percent, and it was only
5.42 percent for non-activists.
Table 6. Logistic regression of political participation and opinions based on the 2013
ABIII (n=1,196)
Model 1
Protest
b
SE
Uprising participation
Protested between Jan 25 & Feb 11, 2011
Minority status
a
Female
b

Coptic Christian

High school or less

c

c

Bachelors or higher

Demgraphic controls
Married
Unemployed
Age
Regional controls
Cairo provinced
e

Urban

Constant
F-Statistic

Model 2
Voting
b
SE

Model 3
Pro-Democracy
b
SE

2.631 **
0.351

-0.218
0.305

-0.589
0.368
0.060
0.432
1.782 **
0.482
2.195 **
0.516

-0.654
0.194
-0.748
0.384
0.459
0.218
1.419
0.297

-0.007
0.376
-0.945
0.729
-0.012
0.013

0.735 **
0.201
0.116
0.355
0.025 **
0.008

0.223
0.243
-0.883 *
0.376
0.010
0.009

0.587
0.408
0.199
0.354
-3.782 **
0.726
11.00 **

-0.394 †
0.232
-0.383 †
0.204
-0.231
0.397
6.36 **

0.386
0.295
0.787 **
0.230
-0.073
0.472
7.92 **

0.637
0.465
**
†
*
**

-0.191
0.209
-1.022 *
0.443
1.106 **
0.245
1.778 **
0.350

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category Muslim; c reference category
illiterate; d reference category other provinces; e reference category rural; † p < .1; * p <
.05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
Women were less likely to protest than men; however, the relationship was not
statistically significant. Model 2 showed that January 25 protestors were less likely to
vote than non-activists, although the results were not statistically significant. The
probability of voting for women was less than that for men (63.21 percent vs. 75.81
percent). Model 3 illustrated that during Morsi’s presidency, the January 25 activists
tended to be more likely to support democracy, and women were less likely than men to
do so. These results were not statistically significant, but they might be pointing to a
possible trend. Control variables show that Coptic Christians were less likely than
Muslims to vote and favor democracy. Education increased the probability of political
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participation and had a positive effect on pro-democracy sentiments. Married individuals
and older Egyptians were more likely to vote than the unmarried and younger individuals.
The unemployed were less likely to support democracy than their employed counterparts,
while urban residents were more likely than non-urban dwellers to do so.
Table 7 demonstrates the logistic regression of political participation and attitudes
among Egyptians in 2016, five years after the uprising. Model 1 suggested that women
were less likely to protest than men, although it is not statistically significant. Model 2
indicated that women were less likely to vote than men. The probability of voting in the
last parliamentary elections for women was 46.97 percent, while it was 58.26 percent for
men.
Table 7. Logistic regression of political participation and opinions based on the 2016
ABIV (n=1,200)
Model 1
Protest
b
SE
Minority status
a
Female
Coptic Christianb
High school or less

c

c

Bachelors or higher

Demgraphic controls
Married
Unemployed
Age
Regional controls
d
Cairo province
Urbane
Constant
F-Statistic

Model 2
Voting
b
SE

Model 3
Pro-Democracy
b
SE

-0.537
0.386
0.848
0.822
0.585
0.621
1.387 *
0.687

-0.511 **
0.135
1.192 **
0.415
-0.017
0.173
-0.025
0.224

-0.129
0.130
0.553 †
0.317
0.599 **
0.169
0.986 **
0.223

-0.727 †
0.395
-0.189
0.885
-0.019
0.016

0.188
0.167
-0.030
0.392
0.038 **
0.006

-0.136
0.156
0.702 †
0.393
0.009 †
0.005

-0.414
0.154
-0.641
0.142
-0.796
0.323
12.26

0.125
0.151
0.274 *
0.139
-0.794 *
0.323
4.78 **

0.719
0.370
0.787
0.381
-3.523
0.951
3.86

†
*
**
**

**
**
*
**

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category Muslim; c reference category
illiterate; d reference category other provinces; e reference category rural; † p < .1; * p <
.05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
Model 3 suggested that the probability of viewing democracy as always
preferable to any other kind of government was lower for women than men despite not
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being statistically significant. As for control variables, Coptic Christians were more likely
to vote than Muslims. Higher education was associated with a higher probability of
protesting and expressing pro-democracy attitudes. Older individuals were more likely
than younger Egyptians to vote. Cairo residents were less likely to vote than other
Egyptians. Urban residents had a higher probability than rural Egyptians of protesting
and favoring democracy, but they were less likely to vote.
DISCUSSION
I track political opinion and participation between 2008 and 2016 in an attempt to
understand how the 18-day uprising and the transitional period that followed affected
how Egyptians viewed and partook in political activities. I used individual-level data
collected at four distinct historical moments to investigate the micro-level reactions to the
changing political contexts. Below, I provide a brief description of these four political
moments between 2008 and 2016. I aim to construct a picture of the political climate that
Egyptians were living through when they made their decisions about political
participation as well as expressed their opinions about democracy.
The WVSV 2008 data were collected between March and May of 2008. At that
time, Egyptians have been living under the autocratic regime of Mubarak for twentyseven years, and under military rule since the 1952 revolution. Mubarak’s Emergency
Law and extreme repression dramatically increased the cost of protest during his
presidency (Bassiouni 2016). However, there was some anti-regime political action
taking place at the time. For instance, the grassroots movement, Kefaya, was created in
2004 to end Mubarak’s presidency and prevent him from transferring power to his sons
(Clarke 2011). The April 6 Youth movement was founded on that date in 2008, while the

103
survey data were being collected (Singerman 2013). At the time, an uprising that could
remove Mubarak in eighteen days was unimaginable to many Egyptians (Bassiouni 2016)
and improbable to many scholars of social movements (Kurzman 2012).
The ABII survey took place between June 16 and June 30, 2011, about five
months after the ousting of Mubarak. At the time, the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces (SCAF) was ruling Egypt. The country’s future was uncertain, with many newly
formed political parties, no clear leadership, and an economy in turmoil. In addition,
many activists were still engaged in street protests, increasingly against SCAF, which
resulted in many deaths and injuries among protestors. For instance, On March 9, the
military broke-up the Tahrir sit-in using unnecessary force that included beating, kicking,
and using electrical shocks on dissenters. They arrested 174 protestors that day, and 134
of them were sentenced to three to five years in prison by military courts. On the same
day, the military arrested twenty female protestors and conducted “virginity tests” on
seventeen of them (Human Rights Watch 2012).
The survey also took place after the March 19 constitutional referendum, which
resulted in a win for both the Muslim Brotherhood as well as SCAF, and a loss for the
newly emerging liberal political parties. Many activists believed that the revolution was
under attack. As a result, they called for street protests to pressure SCAF to support the
demands of the uprising and to get rid of the felool (Arabic for remnants of Mubarak’s
regime). For instance, January 25 protesters called for “Save the Revolution”
demonstration on April 1, 2011, and “Friday of Cleansing” a week later. Hundreds of
thousands of protestors showed up for each of these events (El-Naggar & Slackman
2011; MacFarquhar 2011).
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The ABIII took place between March 31 and April 7, 2013, towards the end of
Morsi’s presidency. By that time, Egyptians have been through a parliamentary election,
a presidential election, and some attempts at creating a new constitution. The survey took
place a few weeks before the Tamarod movement (Arabic for rebellion), which started on
April 28 to remove Morsi from office, was founded. The January 25 uprising succeeded
in removing Mubarak from power; however, it did not end repression. Islamist vigilantes
and SCAF continued to target protestors during the two years that followed. For instance,
the military and security forces used random arrests and excessive force to dissolve
protests in many instances. On June 28 and 29, 2011, during 16-hours clashes, the police
injured 1,114 protesters outside the Ministry of Interior. The Maspero Massacre occurred
on October 9 when the military and riot police ran over thirteen Coptic Christian
protestors and murdered twenty-four others with live ammunition while dispersing a
protest in front of the state TV building in Cairo (Human Rights Watch 2013).
The year 2012 was not a peaceful one. The state continued its extreme repressive
actions against the press, protestors, and activists. The government shut-down a TV
station and three newspapers. The Public Prosecutor interrogated nine journalists for
defamation charges and fifteen Egyptians for insulting Islam. The military arrested about
350 protestors and 300 children during that year. Police murdered about eleven activists
as a result of torture (Human Rights Watch 2013). There was also a general sense of
lawlessness in the country. For instance, the Salafist leader, Sheikh Hazem Salah Abu
Ismail, and his followers surrounded the Cairo’s Media Production City to prevent talkshow anchors from airing their shows that he perceived to be “pro-revolutionaries” and
anti-Islam (Fahmy 2012). At the same time, hundreds of pro-Morsi Islamists protested in
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front of the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, putting it under siege (Middle East
Online 2012). As a result, the judges claimed to be under enough psychological distress
to go on an open-ended strike for the first time since 1919 (Hendawi 2012). Pro-Morsi
thugs also repressed protestors regularly. For instance, on December 12, 2012, they
captured and tortured dozens of his opponents who were protesting in front of the
Presidential Palace (Kirkpatrick 2012).
In January 2013, the Egyptian police murdered forty-six in the city of Port Said
during three days of clashes with protestors. In February, security forces murdered
twenty-two anti-Morsi protestors in Cairo. They also imprisoned and tortured about 800
protestors, including 264 children, in their camps. Pro-Morsi thugs continued to terrorize
protestors. For example, in March 2013, they detained and tortured left-wing activists
who were protesting in front of the Muslim Brotherhood offices (al-Aswany 2013). In
addition to the general political instability, the country was in a state of chaos. The
economy was in shambles (Lynch 2013). There was a shortage of essential items, such as
food and fuel (Kirkpatrick 2013).
ABIV was conducted from April 15 to April 23, 2016, little more than five years
after the Egyptian uprising, and close to three years after the military, led by Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi, seized power in 2013. By that time, Egypt had fully returned to living under a
strict authoritarian rule that banned freedoms of speech and assembly. Egypt experienced
unprecedented instability during the anti-Morsi protests and right after his ousting. The
military arrested the majority of high and mid-level leadership of the Muslim
Brotherhood in the months that followed the removal of Morsi. In July, the police clashed
with the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protestors, killing ninety-five. In August, police broke
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up two Muslim Brotherhood sit-ins at Rab’a al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares in Cairo,
killing more than 1,000 people. They also arrested thousands of protestors, including
1,500 from the Rab’a sit-in. Soon after the end of the sit-ins, Islamists attacked and
burned at least forty-two churches, killing four Christians (Human Rights Watch 2014).
After the re-installation of military rule in 2013, an anti-protest law effectively
outlawed peaceful demonstrations by requiring a protest permit from the local police,
which has unchecked authority to refuse to grant the permit. The law authorized security
forces “to use batons and rubber-and non-rubber-bullets to disperse meetings, rallies and
demonstrations that they themselves deem as violent” (Hamzawy 2016). These new
repressive measures resulted in the death of many protestors. For instance, the security
forces killed forty-nine Egyptians during the peaceful protests marking the third
anniversary of the uprising, and eighteen citizens during the fourth anniversary. There
were 164 cases of disappearances between April 2014 and June 2015. The regime banned
many activists from traveling, and there were 465 victims of police torture between
October 2013 and August 2014. The Ministry of Interior arrested 22,000 citizens in 2014
and 12,000 in 2015 on terrorism charges. During 2015, the regime tried 3,164 civilians in
military courts. In addition, the state targeted human rights NGOs and opposition media
outlets. At the same time, the Egyptian war-on-terror in Sinai escalated during el-Sisi’s
rule. There was an average of thirty attacks per day in 2014 and 100 in 2015. The
government reported killing more than 3,091 “terrorists” in 2015 (Human Rights Watch
2016).
Figure 11 shows that the number of social conflict incidents increased
dramatically after the uprising, growing from forty-nine events in 2010 to eighty-one in
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2011. The peak was in 2013, with a total of 532 incidents. This number was more than
seventeen times the number in 2008, and about 6.56 times that of 2011.
Figure 11. Instances of social conflict in Egypt between 2005 and 2016
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Anti-Regime Non-violent Protests

The mass-protests-turned-military-coup that ousted Morsi took place on June 30,
2013. In addition, the ratio of violent to non-violent incidents also spiked. For instance,
between 2005 and 2011, about half to two-thirds of the social conflict events in Egypt
were non-violent protests. This percentage went down to less than twenty percent in
2013.
Different state and non-state actors such as anti-regime activists, pro-regime
individuals, militant Islamists, security forces, and the military initiated the violent social
conflict events. The incidences targeted groups such as pro-regime Egyptians, antigovernment activists, security forces, the military, foreign individuals, and Coptic
Christians. I counted both types of events because violence is a critical part of the story of
any transitional period. It is established that transitional periods prompt a spike in nonviolent protests (Barrie & Ketchley 2018). These protests could affect the transition to
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democracy negatively because it takes activists’ concentration away from legitimate
political action, such as creating political parties and building coalitions. These activities
might also alienate moderates (Przeworski 1991; Linz & Stepan 1996). I assert that
violent incidents, regardless of the actors, could be even more damaging to
democratization because they create a sense of insecurity among the population and cause
many citizens to lament the old regime’s era, where they felt safer. In a supplemental
analysis, I found that the level of fear among the population corresponded to the number
of social conflict events. For instance, a little less than half of the respondents to the ABII
(47.5 percent) reported that their own personal, as well as their family’s safety and
security, were not ensured or absolutely not ensured in 2011. In 2013, this number
increased to 80.3 percent, or more than four in five Egyptians. In 2016, slightly over one
in five citizens (20.7 percent) felt that way. I argue that this sense of insecurity is one of
the leading forces that shaped political participation and opinions during the transitional
period.
Protest participation. In 2008, only 1.4 percent of Egyptians protested. This
minimal participation is understandable. It resulted from decades of extreme repression,
lack of freedom, and human rights violations. Consequently, protesting might have
seemed pointless at that time because Egyptians lacked cognitive liberation. According to
McAdam (1982), successful mobilization results from the belief that a movement’s goals
are achievable. In 2008, the majority of Egyptians did not have much hope of creating
real political change such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, or free and fair
elections.
After the ousting of Mubarak on February 11, 2011, Egyptians realized that non-
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violent mass demonstrations are the most effective way to have their demands heard.
Many of them felt threatened and uncertain about the future. It is well established that
fear could increase the probability of protest. For example, Walsh (1981) found that in
the case of residents’ mobilization around the incident of the nuclear meltdown at Three
Mile Island, a suddenly imposed grievance that caused a fear of nuclear contamination of
their drinking water increased mobilization. Similarly, mobilization among Arab
Americans peaked in the post-9/11 era because of their fear of the backlash (Azab &
Santoro 2017).
I argue that the sense of insecurity in post-uprising Egypt encouraged many to
protest. This is evident in the issues that people were protesting about. In a supplemental
analysis, I found that those who participated in non-violent action in the five months that
followed the uprising were either worried about their future or that of the country. About
twenty-nine percent joined labor protests or strikes, fifty-one percent protested against the
interim government or particular ministers, sixty-eight percent protested against
corruption, and about sixty-six percent participated in protests demanding that former
regime be brought to trial.27 In other words, Egyptians felt a need to protest because they
were worried about the future, and, like residents of Three Mile Island, they felt that they
had to protect themselves.
Protest participation was still high towards the end of 2012 and the beginning of
2013. During that time, the country was in an exceptional state of unrest that caused
increased fear among citizens. Different groups, such as liberals and Christians, were

27

These numbers add to more than 100% because some respondents participated in
multiple protests.
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protesting against the Muslim Brotherhood and their power grab. Other Egyptians were
protesting because of the food, gas, electricity, and water shortage. Many were also
protesting the new constitution. There were also a large number of pro-Morsi protests.
Again, all these protests could have seemed essential for people’s survival. Probably,
many of the people felt that they had no other choice but to protest (Beaumont 2012;
Ramsey 2013).
Protest participation declined five years after the uprising. There are many reasons
for that. First, el-Sisi repressed protestors and created the anti-protest law. In addition,
many “revolutionaries” felt defeated and believed that the January 25 uprising has failed.
Also, many of the revolutionary figures such as ElBaradei, Wael Ghonim, Amr
Hamzawey, and Bassem Youssef left the country (Black 2013; Paget 2018). Moreover,
the regime imprisoned many activists, such as Alaa Abd El Fattah, Sherif Farag, Ahmad
Mandour, and many more (Soueif 2014).
Voting. Three years before the uprising, little less than 1 in 3 Egyptians claimed to
have voted in the past parliamentary elections. Besides the fact that people tend to
overreport voting (Bernstein, Chadha & Montjoy 2001), many Egyptians voted despite
their lack of interest in politics. Citizens, especially those in rural areas, could have voted
for their employers, those who have connections to the ruling party, and those who could
extend favors to them. Also, many candidates provided incentives for voters, such as
money and food items (Thabet 2006).
Five months after the uprising, more than four in five Egyptians decided that they
would vote in the next elections because it was a particularly important one. The first
parliament after the uprising had the critical task of choosing the committee that will
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write the new constitution and voting on the article of the constitution. Of course, all
Egyptians were invested in such an important milestone.
About seven in ten Egyptians voted in the parliamentary elections that took place
between December 2011 and January 2012. This parliamentary election was especially
important because the parliament was expected to supervise the creation of the new
Egyptian constitution. Political Islam and Mubarak-era politicians were the only
organized parties. Some of the January 25 activists such as Amr Hamzawy were able to
gain enough support in the few months after the uprising to secure a seat at the
parliament. It is established that polarization increases voter turnout (Abramowitz &
Stone 2006). Because of the extreme polarization of the Egyptian political scene, many
Egyptians felt that they had to vote. Pro-Islamists voted because they saw that election as
their opportunity to install an Islamic state in Egypt. Supporters of Mubarak’s era
politicians voted because they wanted to survive. January 25 supporters voted because
they wanted to have a place at the table. Many people also voted because they were afraid
of an Egypt controlled by the Islamists, or because they wanted to make sure that
Mubarak’s era politicians were not elected.
A little more than half of the respondents stated that they voted in the
parliamentary elections that took place between October and December of 2015. The
number was still high because el-Sisi and his state-controlled private TV stations
mobilized Egyptians to vote in an attempt to gain legitimacy after the removal and
imprisonment of Morsi. The percentage was lower than in the previous elections because
there was no real competition. Also, many Egyptians did not vote because they were not
motivated, they did not know the candidates, or they were afraid of going to the polling
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places because of the increased violence. Besides, some anti-regime Egyptians boycotted
the elections as a form of protest. However, participation was still relatively high because
many pro-el-Sisi Egyptians wanted to give legitimacy to the regime by participating
(Sanyal 2016).
Pro-democracy views. Almost all Egyptians expressed pro-democracy views in
2008, three years before the uprising. It might seem counterintuitive that a nondemocratic country such as Egypt has such a high level of support for democracy.
However, this is common among many non-democratic countries around the globe
(Braizat 2010). Some scholars suggest that Arab citizens might have been unclear on the
meaning of the abstract concept “democracy.” Or, they could have been “lip-service
democrats” who claim to support such a system of governing because they think it is the
right answer. Other scholars found that Arabs understand what democracy means to some
extent and that they genuinely hold pro-democracy views (Braizat 2010; Diwan 2013).
I agree with previous research that, in 2008, Egyptian citizens supported
democracy, in part, because doing so was appealing and had no cost. At the time, the
state-sponsored Egyptian media claimed that Egypt was a democracy. There were some
forms of sham “democratic” elections, pseudo opposition, and some Westernized family
laws. In such an inactive political climate, citizens might have been giving their opinions
“in theory,” believing that there is no chance that Egypt could become a democratic
country. Because of that, respondents might not have thought through what democracy
might mean to them personally, or how it might change Egypt. It just remained an
appealing but abstract concept. That is, in 2008, three years before the uprising,
Egyptians’ support for democracy was based on a hypothetical scenario. No one could
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have predicted that an uprising was going to take place.
In a supplemental analysis, I found that Egyptians’ ideas about what democracy
means are a bit unclear. For instance, I found that they seem to give contradictory
responses to a series of questions that asked about the meaning of democracy. The
original question reads:
Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential
characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following
things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use
this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of
democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of
democracy.”
I considered that scores between seven and ten mean that the respondent believed the
item to be an essential characteristic of democracy. I found that the majority of Egyptians
recognized the essential characteristics of democracy such as people’s ability to choose
their leaders in free elections (94.5 percent); having civil rights that protect people’s
liberty against oppression (83.3 percent); people’s ability to change the laws through
referendums (88.5 percent); and women’s ability to have the same rights as men (72
percent). However, many Egyptians also considered the interpretation of laws by
religious authorities (75.6 percent) or the army’s ability to take over when the
government is incompetent (58.9 percent) to be essential characteristics of democracy.
Also, many Egyptians believed economic factors such as taxing the rich and subsidizing
the poor (85.1 percent); prospering economy (86.8 percent); or state aid for
unemployment (60.2 percent) to be essential characteristics of democracy.
The ABII asked citizens about their pro-democracy views after the uprising took
place and after citizens experienced a higher level of political activities in the country. At
that time, many citizens had high hopes. The majority of citizens might have viewed
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democracy as a way to improve their economic situation, in addition to its other political
benefits. For instance, in a supplemental analysis, I found that a little less than two thirds
(63 percent) of the respondents believed that “the most important feature of democracy”
is “providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) to every individual,” or
“narrowing the gap between rich and poor.” Less than one in four Egyptians (23.2
percent) believed that political and religious freedoms, freedom to criticize the
government, or free elections are the most essential features. About 12.4 percent believed
that it is fighting corruption. Interestingly, only 1.4 percent of respondents claimed that
they did not know. Of course, the question specifically asked respondents about the most
important feature, not what democracy means. However, it shows that about a quarter of
Egyptians thought of civil and political rights as the most crucial aspect of democracy.
Regardless of their understanding of the meaning of the concept, only one in twenty
Egyptians did not support democracy at that time.
At that time, the country was under the control of SCAF, but there was a
relatively high level of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. SCAF was
repressing protestors, but not at the same pre-uprising levels. Many political parties were
forming at the time. The majority of Egyptians were becoming more interested in
politics. I contend that support for democracy was high at the time because people were
optimistic about the future, and their sense of collective efficacy was high.
In 2013, the presidency belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, but the military was
still in power. As mentioned previously, there was a considerable spike in the number of
incidents of social disturbances. Many supported the Muslim Brotherhood and were
willing to engage in violence to keep them in power. Many more viewed the military as
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their savior because the Muslim Brotherhood did not control it. At that point, many
Egyptians had already turned on the uprising. They felt that they did not gain anything
from it. They equated democracy with the Muslim Brotherhood rule and blamed these
results on the level of illiteracy among Egyptians. As Masoud (2014: 12) stated, “the
equality of all citizens regardless of gender or belief, […] the necessity of pluralism in
politics are all, if not entirely alien to the Islamic world view, far from settled within it.”
As a result, support for democracy decreased. About one in four Egyptians believed that
democracy was not the best way to govern the country. This decrease in support for
democracy could have resulted from Egyptians’ belief that democracy did not benefit
them. Remember that Morsi won 51.7 percent of the votes; the rest of the votes went to
the Mubarak era candidate (Kirkpatrick 2012). The country was clearly divided at that
time. Anti-Muslim Brotherhood Egyptians might have believed that democracy would
always result in a complete monopoly of power by the Muslim Brotherhood because they
would always win enough votes to control the presidency and the parliament. In that
sense, democracy might have seemed like a simple way to legitimize a one-party rule.
Pro-Muslim Brotherhood citizens might have seen democracy, which includes freedom
of press and freedom of assembly, as hindering their capacity to rule the country
effectively.
In 2016, five years after the uprising, a little less than one in two Egyptians did
not believe that democracy is preferred to any other system of governance. Democracy
lost its popularity because, for many Egyptians, it failed. Five years after the uprising,
they were in the same position that they were in before the uprising. They were under
authoritarian rule. The political scene did not change. Most importantly, this was done
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with the blessing of the majority of the Egyptian people. Remember that millions of
Egyptians went in the streets on June 30 and July 3, 2013, begging the army to depose
Morsi (Holmes & Baoumi 2016). By that point, Egyptians’ experiences with democracy
were not at all positive. Many people have turned against the uprising by that time and
blamed the January 25 activists for the situation that the country was in. After five years
of political chaos, economic downturn, and higher restraints on human rights and civil
liberties, many Egyptians might have decided that they were done with democracy.
In conclusion, I contend that support for democracy is closely related to the
political and economic context. In the case of Egypt, people supported democracy when
they were living under an autocratic regime, when democracy was just an appealing
concept. They also supported it after being liberated by an uprising that ousted their
dictator. They might have believed that democracy could liberate them and improve their
civil liberties. However, many Egyptians lost their support for democracy when they
realized that it did not improve their civil liberties, political climate, or economic
situation. Many more lost their support for democracy when Egypt returned to military
rule less than five years after the uprising.
Were protestors different from non-protestors? January 25 protestors were more
likely than non-participants to protest after the uprising. These results agree with
McAdam’s findings. Freedom Summer participants were also more likely to remain
politically active after the campaign than the no-shows (McAdam 1988). January 25
activists were more likely to do so both five months and two years later, likely because
they discovered that non-violent action works. Protesting worked during the 18-day
uprising, so they might have believed that it will continue to work after that, even when
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the majority of the population stopped supporting protests. They also could have
developed what McAdam calls an activist identity, which compels them to continue with
their political involvement because it becomes a part of their personal identities.
Five months after the uprising, protestors were more likely than non-protestors to
claim that they will vote in the next parliamentary election. Remember, this was going to
be the first parliamentary elections after the successful removal of Mubarak. More than
nineteen in every twenty protestors (95.9 percent) claimed that they would vote, but only
four in five non-protestors (82.2 percent) actually did. The difference might have resulted
from their sense of accomplishment and efficacy after the revolution succeeded in
removing Mubarak in just 18 days. For instance, in a supplemental analysis, I found that
more than four in five protestors (80.2 percent) claimed that the uprising gave them
“feelings of personal victory,” whereas less than half of non-protestors (49.6 percent) felt
the same way.
In 2013, protestors were less likely to have voted in the first parliamentary
elections after the uprising than non-protestors. The difference was not statistically
significant, and it was small in magnitude (67.8 percent vs. 69.4 percent). These results
suggest that the percentage of Egyptians who claimed that they would vote in the
parliamentary election was higher than the percentage who actually voted. Protestors
were slightly less likely to vote, possibly because some of them did not agree fully with
any of the candidates in their districts at the time.
Protestors were more likely than non-protestors to support democracy both five
months and two years after the uprising. However, these results were not statistically
significant. More than ninety-eight percent of protestors supported democracy, but less
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than ninety-five percent of non-protestors shared the same opinion. These results show
that the majority of Egyptians were pro-democracy at that time. Activists were more
likely to support democracy, probably because they were more politically informed, and
they enjoyed the fact that they could influence the political life in Egypt. They might
have reached the conclusion that democracy could allow them to continue to influence
the political scene. Two years later, activists were still more likely than non-activists to
support democracy (90.5 percent vs. 74.1 percent), probably because they still hoped that
the uprising might succeed in achieving a sustainable democracy. Remember, this was
before the Tamarod Movement and the military coup. At the time, many anti-Morsi
activists believed that they could either vote him out or force him out through a mass
non-violent revolution.
Were women different than men? When looking at the totality of my results, we
can see a clear trend. Women were less likely than men to protest before, during, and
after the Egyptian uprising. However, the results were only statistically significant during
the 18-day non-violent campaign. In 2008, three years before the uprising, protesting was
not the norm. Only a slim percentage of Egyptians (1.4%) were involved in activism.
Because of the selective nature of this group, the probability of recruiting women was
exceptionally high. This might be causing the lack of statistically significant results, even
though the trend still existed. Looking at my macro-level data, I found that most of the
protests that took place in 2008 were initiated by the Muslim Brotherhood college
students, other college students, Kefaya movement, anti-Mubarak activists, relatives of
jailed Muslim Brotherhood members, or people protesting police brutality.
During the uprising, all classes of Egyptians were participating, and we can see a
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clear gender gap in mobilization during that period. After the uprising, both men and
women felt the urgency of the political moment that they were in. Also, it became more
socially acceptable for Egyptians to join protests as families, including women, men, and
children. For instance, during the June 30, 2013, anti-Morsi protest, it was the norm to
see men, women, and children in the protests, and women were less concerned about
sexual harassment (Stoter 2013). I suspect that this trend carried until five years after the
uprising, especially in the pro-el-Sisi demonstrations. It would be interesting to see
whether there is a gender gap in protest participation ten years after the uprising.
Women voted at lesser rates than men both before and after the uprising. These
results are a bit surprising because one might assume that women would be more
attracted than men to the relatively less confrontational activity of voting. However, if we
think of the voting process in Egypt, this might shed some light on the persistent gender
gap. In Egypt, polling places usually have very long lines. There is a noticeable presence
of armed security forces who monitor the lines (Sanyal 2016). In many cases, people who
are standing in the lines are supporters of a particular candidate, and they harass other
voters, trying to convince them to vote for their candidate. Because the polling stations
themselves are not as private, there is a good chance for people to see how others voted.
Also, the high rates of illiteracy among Egyptian women might have contributed to the
problem (The Carter Center 2012). These conditions might be intimidating to some
women and prevent them from voting.
Women’s attitudes towards democracy were a bit unexpected because it is
established that women are generally more likely to support democracy than men. For
instance, a research that surveyed 9,713 people from forty-four countries in Africa, North
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and South America, Asia, Europe, and Oceania between 1991 and 1996 found that,
compared to men, women “strongly support the democratic system and attitudes, are less
psychologically authoritarian, give less support for political repression and militarism”
(Franen & Meloen 2000: 121). However, Egyptian women’s lack of support for
democracy could be caused by living in a gender-restrictive autocratic context. In chapter
three, we established that membership in politicizing networks increases the probability
of protest. I contend that such ties also increase political awareness in general. Women
lack access to such networks.
In 2008, women in Egypt were less likely than men to express support for
democracy (96.8 percent vs. 98.2 percent). It is interesting, however, that there were little
differences between women and men in their understanding of the meaning of
democracy. When there were differences, women were usually more accurate. For
instance, only 56.2 percent of women believed that the ability of the army to take over is
an essential characteristic of democracy, whereas 63.1 percent of men believed so. The
difference in pro-democracy sentiments could be the result of the difference in access to
education and political networks between men and women.
Women were less likely than men to express pro-democracy ideology five months
after the uprising. Of course, the overwhelming majority of both men and women
espoused pro-democracy views. The probability of holding such views when controlling
for all variables in the model was 92.6 percent for women, and 97.6 percent for men.
Also, women and men seemed to have a different understanding of what democracy
means. Women were more likely to view democracy in terms of economic gains, whereas
men were more likely to think of political freedoms. About 68.5 percent of women and
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57.7 percent of men believed that “the most important feature of democracy” is
“providing basic items (such as food, housing, and clothing) to every individual,” or
“narrowing the gap between rich and poor.” About one in every three men (32.4 percent),
but only 13.8 percent of women, believed political and religious freedoms, freedom to
criticize the government, or free elections to be the most essential feature. Also, women
were about 9.5 times more like than men to claim that they do not know what the most
important feature of democracy is (2.57 percent vs. .27 percent).
Although not statistically significant, we see that the trend continues during the
reign of the Muslim Brotherhood and el-Sisi. Besides the lack of networks, women might
have seen democracy as less appealing after the spike in incidents of social conflict and
the lack of necessary items during that time. Women might have been especially affected
by the lack of security during the transitional period. Many of them might have lacked
physical, sexual, and economic security. Their experiences might have affected their
views on democracy.
CONCLUSION
The study of transitional periods started in the 1970s and gained momentum
recently. Transitional periods are particularly important in determining the ultimate
success of a non-violent anti-regime campaign. Most of the available literature uses
macro-level data to analyze how happening during transition periods affect
democratization. I aim to add to the literature by investigating how the transitional period
affects citizens’ political participation and opinions. I do so by tracking Egyptians’
protest participation, voting behavior, and pro-democracy views during an eight-year
time period that starts in 2008, three years prior to the Egyptian uprising of 2011, and
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ends in 2016, five years after the non-violent campaign. My results suggest that political
participation peaks after such events. The level of engagement decreases after that, but it
stays higher than the pre-campaign levels. Contrarily, support for democracy declines
steadily during a failed attempt at transitioning to democracy.
My data have some limitations. For instance, the questions about protesting have
different time frames in each survey. In the World Value Survey, the question asked if
the respondent has ever protested. In the Second Wave of the Arab Democracy
Barometer, the question asks about the period between February 11, when Mubarak was
ousted, and the date of the survey, about five months later. In the other two surveys, the
question is about the past three years. I would have preferred if the time frame was
similar (e.g., one year) for all four questions. However, the current questions give us an
idea of the general trends of protest participation during these four distinct times in the
Egyptian history. In addition, these surveys had the rare opportunity of capturing
snapshots of political participation and opinions during chaotic times, such as a failed
transitional period.
More detailed micro-level data are also needed to determine how transitional
periods affect different segments of society. For instance, which groups become more
politically involved during and after a transitional period? How do minority populations
such as religious and ethnic minorities, illiterate individuals, those living in extreme
poverty, disabled individuals, and LGBTQ activists benefit from a transitional period?
How do emotions such as fear, anger, mistrust, or hatred affect people’s decisions during
these critical periods?
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I attempted to answer one central question: does the Westerndriven model of recruitment to, and consequences of, high-risk activism that McAdam
introduced before the internet apply to non-violent anti-regime campaigns in autocratic
contexts in the era of social media? My core theoretical framework included three bodies
of social movement scholarship. I built on McAdam’s (1986) model of recruitment to
high-risk activism, which he based on the Freedom Summer campaign that took place in
Mississippi in 1964. I also utilized the recent literature on the effect of the internet on
social movements processes. In addition, I used literature on transitional periods. I
engaged in a dialogue between these three subfields of social movement scholarship by
applying the Western-driven model to the case of the Egyptian uprising of 2011. I used
individual-level data from the Second, Third, and Fourth waves of the Arab Democracy
Barometer survey as well as the World Value Survey, Fifth Wave, to examine
recruitment to, and consequences of, the non-violent campaign. The uprising was an 18day non-violent movement that started as a protest against police brutality and ended with
the ousting of Mubarak, a military dictator who has been ruling Egypt for almost 30 years
at the time of the uprising.
I found that face-to-face networks are still the most effective way of recruitment
to high-risk non-violent campaigns in autocratic societies. Online political networking
through social media forums such as Facebook and Twitter are important in creating new
forms of activism. Social media is especially effective in mobilizing women in such
autocratic gender-restrictive contexts. I also found that transitional periods following
such campaigns encourage political participation, but they might diminish support for
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democracy.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss my key findings. I will then explain
how each finding contributes to the existing social movement literature. I will follow this
with a discussion of the main limitations of my research. Based on my discussion of the
limitations of the project, I will discuss some possibilities for future research. Finally, I
will discuss some practical implications of my research.
KEY FINDINGS
In chapter two, I examined whether McAdam’s model that argues that face-toface networks and biographical availability are the most important determinants of
participation in high-risk movements would apply to high-risk non-violent anti-regime
movements in the era of social media. I argued that face-to-face networks are the most
important determinants of street-protest participation, but social media creates new forms
of activism, such as online activism. Social media also could facilitate street protests by
allowing people on the ground to connect with other citizens. Using the Second Wave of
the Arab Democracy Barometer, I found support for my argument. My results show that
among those who did not claim to support Mubarak during the 18-day uprising, face-toface networks increased the probability of street-protest dramatically, but online networks
had no statistically significant effect on that form of activism.
However, online political networks created a new form of dissent – online
activism. Online activists did not participate in the street protests, but they were essential
to the uprising. They “supported the protests against Mubarak through the internet, such
as Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube.” Their participation included acts such as posting
information and verifying rumors about security forces’ movements, incidents of arrest

125
and torture of protestors, safe places for women to protest, and needed medical and food
supplies. They also posted videos encouraging Egyptians to join the protests. This new
form of activism was only possible because of social media. Online political networks
also might have played a crucial role in supporting street protestors by allowing them to
communicate with others outside the protest sites, including online activists. This ability
to create their own narrative and be able to control their image by posting their own
reports from the ground might have increased their effectiveness.
In chapter three, I tested whether the effect of online political networks on streetprotest in non-violent anti-regime campaigns in gender-restrictive environments is
different for women than men. I used the Second Wave of the Arab Democracy
Barometer to test my argument that social media is more important in mobilizing women
than men in such environments. The results support my argument. I found that
controlling for factors such as education, income, place of residence, marital status, and
Western feminist ideology, online political networking increased the probability of
protest for women but had no effect on men. The effect of online networks was so strong
that it closed the gender gap, causing the likelihood of protest for women to almost match
that of men.
Chapter four assessed whether political participation and opinion change after an
initially successful non-violent anti-regime campaign that eventually fail in transitioning
to a functioning democracy. I argued that during such transitional periods, citizens
increase their political participation, but their support for democracy declines. I used the
Second, Third, and Fourth waves of the Arab Democracy Barometer, the Fifth Wave of
the World Value Survey, and a collection of incidents of social conflict between 2005
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and 2016 to test my argument. I found that protest participation increased right after the
uprising, in June 2011, from its levels in 2008. Protest reached its highest level in March
2013, during Morsi’s presidency. Protest participation declined in 2016, five years after
the uprising, but it was still higher than pre-uprising levels. Voting behavior acted in a
similar fashion. It increased dramatically during the first parliamentary elections after the
uprising. Voting declined five years after the non-violent campaign, but it remained
higher than its levels in 2008. Opinions about democracy declined steadily after the
uprising. I also found that the January 25 protestors were more likely to protest than nonactivists both five months and two years after the uprising. Women were less likely to
protest, vote, or support democracy than men both before and after the non-violent
campaign.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS LITERATURE
In this dissertation, I added to the literature by examining the Western-driven
model of recruitment to high-risk movements in the context of non-violent anti-regime
movements in autocratic societies during the social media era. I made small contributions
to the literature in each of my chapters. In chapter two, I added to our understanding of
recruitment to high-risk non-violent anti-regime campaigns in autocratic societies by
providing empirical evidence that correlates of participation in street protests are similar
to those in Western democracies. I also moved beyond the argument of whether social
media is effective in recruitment to street protests. Instead, I suggested that social
movement scholars should examine the new ways in which social media could mobilize
individuals by creating new forms of activism. My results suggested that social media
mobilized people who otherwise would not have participated in the uprising – those who
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only supported the uprising through social media forums such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube.
In my third chapter, I added to the ongoing discussion about the importance of the
social location of the actor to social movement processes. I argued that in a genderrestrictive environment, recruitment tools, including the internet, affect women and men
differently. I contended that researchers should not treat the internet as gender-neutral.
The internet could be a rather useful recruitment tool in contexts where women lack
access to more traditional ways of political networking. My findings also challenge the
idea that most politically active Egyptian women are Westernized. I found that online
political networking mobilized Egyptian women, regardless of whether they adopted
Western feminist ideology.
In my fourth chapter, I added to the conversation about the transitional periods.
Most scholars think of transitional periods as the crucial few months or years that
determine whether a democratic breakthrough would lead to democratization. However,
transitologists have largely ignored the importance of the transitional periods in shaping
political activities and attitudes among citizens. I argued that the transitional periods
could shape the political participation and opinions of citizens.
LIMITATIONS
Working on this project, I encountered some limitations that resulted from my
case study (the Egyptian uprising) or the nature of my data that scholars could address in
future research. Like much of the literature on social movements, I chose Egypt as my
single case study. Some might argue that we need more than one case to reach
generalizable findings about recruitment to high-risk anti-regime campaigns in autocratic
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societies. I agree that further research is needed, but I contend that the Egyptian case
gives us some insights about high-risk non-violent campaigns. The results might not be
generalizable to all such movements. However, the Egyptian case might be more
applicable to autocratic regimes where citizens share a mostly homogeneous ethnic
background, there is a well-organized religious opposition, and the military is particularly
strong.
The Arab Democracy Barometer data were exceptionally suitable for this
research. It is one of the only data sets that provide us with an accurate representation of
Egyptians’ political action and opinions. However, survey data in general have some
limitations. In many social movement surveys, respondents are asked about their
participation, their emotional state, and their opinions after the fact. In the case of the
Arab Democracy Barometer, respondents were asked about their actions and opinions
during the 18-day uprising five months later. This is a relatively short period of time
compared to other surveys. But it still might be a bit problematic because people might
change their narratives, especially in a fluid situation such as a transitional period that
followed a successful anti-regime non-violent campaign. I noticed that the survey took
measures to counter this problem, such as asking the same question in different ways and
in different parts of the survey. They also allowed respondents to fill in their answers and
included an option of “I do not know” to allow for a higher level of accuracy.
One issue that is also common to many surveys that use a representative sample
of the population, and are not activist specific, is that the raw number of activists was not
large enough to allow us a better understanding of the variations within the group. For
example, I was not able to test whether participants of the first three days of the uprising,
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before it became popular, were different from other protestors. Also, it would have been
interesting to test how participating in days of extreme repression, such as The Day of
The Camel, might have affected protestors. However, this survey allowed me to
distinguish between street-protestors and online activists.
FUTURE RESEARCH
My work on this dissertation directed me towards many areas that are worth
exploring further. First, we need to move towards a more nuanced understanding of how
emotions influence the decision-making of activists in high-risk movements. To gain
insights into the interplay between state actions and activists’ emotional responses and
subsequent counteractions, scholars should start analyzing the content of social media
posts, such as tweets and Facebook posts, that the activists send during protest events.
These posts should give us a better understanding of the on-the-ground decision-making
processes. The posts represent what activists are experiencing, how they interpret these
experiences, their emotional reactions, and their discussions of what the next moves
should be. The posts also include the moments when activists reach final decisions and
start to act on them. Activists during the Egyptian Uprising, for instance, were
documenting their experiences such as repression by security forces or pro-regime
counter-protestors, acts of support by the military, or even kind gestures by on-lookers in
their posts. Many of them also documented their emotional reactions, and their
subsequent counteractions through their tweets and Facebook posts. Analyzing these rich
data could shed some light on the usually undocumented crucial moments, or hours,
when important decisions are being made.
Second, future research should use the Arab Democracy Barometer Data to
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compare the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. Both countries were a part of the Arab Spring,
but they had very different outcomes. Tunisia, so far, has been able to transition to a
stable and functioning democracy, whereas Egypt returned to military rule in less than
five years. Understanding some of the individual-level forces that might have contributed
to the different outcomes should be of great interest to the scholars of social movements.
Third, future research is needed to evaluate the long-term consequences of
activism among participants in failed non-violent anti-regime campaigns. Building on
McAdam’s model, we should expect activists in high-risk movements to be different
from non-activists in their career choices, personal lives, and future political involvement.
However, activists in failed anti-regime campaigns might face some challenges that are
unique to that type of movements, such as long imprisonments, severe injuries, or
inability to find work.
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation provides important insights into non-violent high-risk campaigns
in autocratic societies. In chapter two, my findings suggest that the Western-driven model
of recruitment to high-risk campaigns applies to the case of the Egyptian uprising.
Chapter two highlights the importance of online forums such as Facebook and Twitter to
mobilization. My results suggest that the internet is an important recruitment tool. Social
movement literature needs to pay more attention to the effect of social media on
recruitment. Social media could also be an important source of data. It could provide us
with a better understanding of happenings on the ground.
Chapter three suggests that in gender-restrictive autocratic societies, online
forums could play a crucial role in mobilizing women. My findings suggest that

131
membership in politicizing networks is key to recruitment. Social media was especially
useful for the recruitment of women because it allowed them safe access to Egyptian
political ties. Social media was one way of gaining access to politicizing networks. I
suspect that any other way of creating such networks would have been effective in
mobilizing women.
Chapter four emphasizes the importance of the transitional periods. Not only do
they affect the ultimate success of a non-violent anti-regime campaign, but they also
affect political participation and opinions among citizens. My results suggest that to
increase citizens’ support for democracy following an initially successful anti-regime
campaign, leaders of the movement should try to keep incidents of social disturbance to a
minimum. If the level of chaos during the transitional period was successfully reduced,
political participation should stay at high levels. However, this would result from hope
for the future instead of fear. Moreover, support for democracy might actually increase.
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APPENDIX A. WEIGHTED MEANS FOR TOTAL SAMPLE, PROTESTORS,
STREET-PROTESTORS, ONLINE ACTIVISTS, AND PARTICIPANTS IN BOTH
ONLINE AND STREET ACTIVISM

Protest variables
Protest participation
Street protest only
On-line activism only
Street protest and on-line activism
Networks
Face-to-face networks
On-line political networks
Organizational involvement
Biographical availability
Female
Age
Married
Unemployed
Class controls
High income
College graduate
Political interest controls
Anti-Mubarak
Political interest
Religion
Coptic Christian
Regional controls
Cairo province
Alexandria province
Canal province
Delta province
Upper Egypt provinces
Urban

Whole sample

Protest participation

Street-protest only

On-line activism only

SE
(n =1,033)

SE
(n =91)

SE
(n =66)

SE
(n =33)

Street protest and
on-line activism
SE
(n =25)

8.87%
0.91%
6.43%
0.79%
3.54%
0.63%
2.44%
0.49%

100.00%

--

--

--

--

100.00%

--

--

--

--

100.00%

--

--

--

--

100.00%

30.29%
1.47%
10.88%
1.02%
7.53%
0.84%

86.20%
3.83%
35.15%
5.19%
27.45%
4.82%

80.96%
5.12%
20.70%
5.23%
18.66%
4.87%

76.28%
8.20%
70.48%
8.94%
20.49%
7.68%

100.00%

47.37%
1.59%
38.13
0.44
78.70%
1.35%
6.18%
0.82%

23.23%
4.47%
35.49
1.21
67.06%
5.24%
5.70%
2.77%

23.98%
5.36%
36.64
1.44
73.61%
5.86%
6.06%
3.39%

28.03%
7.74%
31.18
1.86
59.40%
9.12%
10.40%
5.91%

21.23%
8.17%
32.48
2.20
49.80%
10.46%
4.76%
4.72%

21.81%
1.96%
20.46%
1.28%

27.92%
7.09%
46.70%
5.40%

32.67%
9.07%
39.89%
6.23%

33.92%
13.49%
66.20%
9.00%

15.42%
9.51%
64.66%
9.97%

91.41%
0.88%
26.34%
1.39%

96.69%
1.92%
52.93%
5.42%

98.73%
1.27%
44.71%
6.28%

100.00%
40.91%
8.96%

91.33%
6.06%
74.58%
9.26%

4.77%
0.64%

2.82%
1.64%

2.29%
1.62%

4.70%
3.42%

4.21%
4.20%

20.62%
1.25%
12.25%
1.03%
11.93%
1.08%
27.19%
1.45%
28.02%
1.42%
43.14%
1.58%

44.83%
5.36%
11.57%
3.50%
12.00%
3.43%
15.40%
4.01%
16.21%
4.07%
63.73%
5.27%

35.49%
5.99%
14.36%
4.52%
12.54%
4.13%
17.91%
5.01%
19.70%
5.22%
57.82%
5.22%

30.84%
8.22%
0.00%

69.45%
9.52%
4.20%
4.20%
10.57%
6.23%
8.78%
6.11%
6.99%
4.91%
79.31%
8.57%

14.43%
7.19%
12.16%
6.70%
42.57%
9.01%
52.09%
9.20%

73.24%
9.13%
50.63%
10.46%
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APPENDIX B. WEIGHTED MEANS FOR THE ENTIRE SAMPLE, WOMEN, AND
MEN
Dependent variable
Protest
Independent variables
Female
Online political networks
Social media membership
Use internet for information about political activities
Use internet to articulate political opinions
Use internet to engage with political opposition
Network controls
Face-to-face networks
Organizational involvement
Class controls
Low income
Middle income
High income
Illiterate
High school or less
Bachelors or higher
Western feminist ideology
Demographic controls
Age
Unemployed
Married
Coptic Egyptian
Regional controls
Cairo province
Alexandria province
Canal province
Delta province
Upper Egypt provinces
Urban

Entire Sample
SE
(n =1019)

Women
SE
(n =489)

Men
SE
(n =530)

8.90%
0.92%

4.21%
0.92%

13.12%
1.52%

47.40%
1.60%
10.79%
1.02%
12.15%
1.08%
13.45%
1.12%
9.50%
0.97%
13.09%
1.11%

--

--

6.32%
1.10%
6.51%
1.11%
9.49%
1.32%
4.64%
0.92%
7.96%
1.22%

14.81%
1.65%
17.23%
1.76%
17.01%
1.74%
13.89%
1.62%
17.71%
1.77%

30.40%
1.48%
7.50%
0.84%

29.40%
2.08%
3.61%
0.84%

31.30%
2.09%
11.01%
1.40%

11.51%
1.02%
67.26%
1.50%
11.18%
0.98%
26.34%
0.98%
53.12%
1.60%
20.54%
1.30%
14.44
0.22

13.13%
1.55%
65.28%
2.18%
8.44%
1.25%
34.44%
2.16%
49.37%
2.29%
16.19%
1.69%
17.88
0.26

10.05%
1.36%
69.05%
2.06%
13.64%
1.48%
19.03%
1.71%
56.51%
2.22%
24.47%
1.92%
11.34
0.28

38.14
0.44
6.16%
0.82%
79.23%
1.35%
4.83%
0.65%

37.72
0.62
3.02%
0.80%
80.62%
1.82%
5.02%
0.97%

38.52
0.63
8.99%
1.37%
77.97%
1.98%
4.67%
0.87%

20.68%
1.26%
12.41%
1.04%
11.99%
1.09%
27.04%
1.46%
27.87%
1.43%
43.29%
1.59%

20.85%
1.81%
12.01%
1.48%
11.33%
1.47%
26.99%
2.08%
28.82%
2.06%
43.33%
2.27%

20.52%
1.76%
12.78%
1.47%
12.59%
1.59%
27.08%
2.05%
27.02%
1.98%
43.25%
2.23%
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APPENDIX C. WEIGHTED MEANS FOR EACH SURVEY
WVS 2008
SE
(n =3,042)
Dependent variables
Protset
Voting
Prodemocracy
Independent variables
Protested between Jan 25 & Feb 11, 2011
Female
Minority status
Coptic Christian
Illiterate
High school or less
Bachelors or higher
Demgraphic controls
Married
Unemployed
Age
Regional controls
Cairo province
Urban

ABII 2011
SE
(n =1,202)

ABIII 2013
SE
(n =1,196)

ABIV 2016
SE
(n =1,200)

1.41%
0.21%
31.17%
0.84%
97.35%
0.29%

2.72%
0.47%
83.33%
1.10%
94.89%
0.63%

10.79%
1.29%
69.25%
1.87%
76.04%
1.78%

3.46%
0.61%
52.50%
1.56%
53.82%
1.55%

--

11.66%
1.29%
50.88%
2.00%

--

61.70%
0.88%

8.06%
0.81%
49.13%
1.48%

6.32%
0.44%
29.24%
0.82%
57.74%
0.90%
13.02%
0.61%

5.26%
0.62%
28.25%
1.31%
52.53%
1.47%
19.22%
1.16%

5.51%
0.92%
43.77%
2.01%
48.33%
2.00%
7.90%
0.61%

4.15%
0.58%
18.23%
1.10%
64.60%
1.45%
17.16%
1.18%

76.05%
0.77%
4.51%
0.38%
41.01
0.26

78.60%
1.26%
6.19%
0.77%
37.87
0.41

66.91%
1.95%
6.44%
0.98%
37.09
0.59

70.57%
1.53%
4.37%
0.72%
37.00
0.44

27.84%
0.81%
46.35%
0.90%

20.88%
1.17%
42.38%
1.46%

20.85%
1.58%
36.11%
1.84%

28.04%
1.39%
44.88%
1.54%

49.92%
1.55%
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APPENDIX D. TIMELINE OF SOME MAJOR HAPPENINGS DURING THE 18DAY UPRISING
The uprising started on Tuesday, January 25, 2011, with several protests taking
place in Tahrir Square in Cairo, as well as in the cities of Alexandria and Suez
simultaneously. That day has since been dubbed The Day of Revolt. There were several
clashes between the protestors and the riot police on that first day. Protestors utilized the
use of social media to communicate crucial information about safe areas and the
whereabouts of the riot police. They also discussed their next moves. Despite a large
number of protestors, the riot police were eventually able to empty Tahrir Square in less
than half an hour, and they arrested about 500 dissenters in the process. All these
repressive actions took place after Habib Ibrahim El-Adly, the Minister of Interior, issued
a statement claiming that the ministry respects the demonstrators’ rights to express their
views, but warned them against damaging buildings or throwing stones at the police.
Despite the repressive actions of the riot police and security forces,
protests continued on Wednesday after the spread of news of the death of three
protestors in Suez and the death of a policeman in Cairo on the previous day.
However, repression continued, resulting in the injury of ten police officers and
55 protestors in the city of Suez on Wednesday. On Thursday, the third day of the
uprising, the government ordered internet companies to stop BlackBerry
Messenger, Twitter, and Facebook, hoping to paralyze the protestors by isolating
them from their primary sources of communication. However, the protestors
reacted to this situation by using WhatsApp and text messages to continue their
communication. They also announced thirty-five churches and mosques as
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meeting points for the “Friday of Rage” protests that took place the next day. Violent
clashes with the riot police continued throughout the day in Cairo, Suez, Alexandria,
Tanta, and Ismailia. At the same time, the Minister of Interior, in a failed attempt at
terrorizing the insurgents, warned that police would use force to disperse protestors.
However, his threats did not frighten the protestors who were well aware of the riot
police repressive tactics.
On Friday, January 28, the fourth day of the uprising, the protests continued
throughout the country, with tens of thousands of protestors. Tahrir Square was the main
attraction point. Protestors started flocking towards the square from all over the country.
The riot police reacted by trying to make it as difficult as possible for the protestors to
reach the square. They used tear gas, water cannons, batons, and rubber bullets to
disperse the thousands of demonstrators who were converging on Tahrir Square. The
dissidents who started to chant “down with Mubarak” and “the people want to overthrow
the regime” suffered a great deal of repression on that day. Many of them were injured,
but there were no deaths in Tahrir. Unfortunately, ten protestors and one police officer
died in the clashes between riot police and protestors in the city of Suez.
Back in Tahrir, tens of thousands of protestors reached the square after hours of
clashes with the riot police. Some of the protestors set fire to the National Democratic
Party (NDP) headquarters. Because of the proximity of Tahrir to the Egyptian Museum
of Antiquities, army vehicles, which were present in the vicinity but did not want to take
the side of the protestors or the riot police, moved in front of the museum to protect it
from vandalism or looting. After the extreme effort it took the protestors to reach Tahrir
Square, many of them decided to spend the night there to avoid going through the same
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ordeal the next day. Although the riot police were dealing with the protestors in
Tahrir, the rest of the police force withdrew from streets and prisons across
Egypt, and thousands of inmates “escaped.” Late that night, Mubarak spoke for
the first time since Tuesday. He announced that he was replacing the government
and the Prime Minister. His speech only agitated the protestors.
Mubarak appointed his first Vice President since he came into power on Saturday,
January 29. By that time, there were many rumors about the whereabouts of Mubarak that
ranged from him leaving the country to him being in a remote resort city on the Red Sea.
All internet services were still off, and there were no police on the streets. However, there
were still periodic clashes between protestors and riot police in Tahrir Square. Citizens
formed neighborhood watches, and the army declared a curfew that was largely ignored.
On Sunday, January 30, the sixth day of the uprising, the US Embassy in Cairo urged its
citizens to leave the country. In a huge boost to the protestors’ morale, Mohamed Mustafa
ElBaradei, a famous Egyptian human rights advocate and Nobel Prize winner, showed up
in Tahrir and sided with the protestors. He also gave a speech urging demonstrators to be
resilient and hold their ground.
On Monday, January 31, the international community was still supporting
Mubarak. For instance, the US showed support for Mubarak, but advised him to
listen to the demands of the people. Also, Israel demanded that the international
community support Mubarak. In a move that emboldened the protestors, the
military announced in no uncertain terms that it would not use violence against
protestors. At the same time, Mubarak formed a new cabinet and replaced the
much-hated minister of the interior with an unknown person. These new
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developments encouraged the demonstrators to continue with their movement. In Tahrir
Square, more than a quarter of a million demonstrators were now permanently camped.
Tuesday, February 1, day eight of the uprising, was the first time that all classes
and segments of the Egyptian population joined in the protests that were started by
opposition groups, social media activists, and human rights advocates. There were close
to one-million demonstrators in Tahrir that day. However, in what seemed like the only
calculated move in the 18-day uprising, Mubarak gave his second speech that day. It was
an emotional one, in which he announced that he would not run for re-election. He
reminded the people of his role in the 1973 war against Israel and asked the people to let
him leave in dignity. This speech divided Egyptians into those who wanted to let
Mubarak leave in dignity as he asked, and those who wanted to continue with the
uprising and have him leave immediately. In a clearly insincere move, the new Egyptian
Vice President vowed to guarantee the security of the protestors. However, all train
services to Cairo and underground metro services in Cairo stopped in an attempt at
isolating the protestors in Tahrir and cutting off any possible support for them. For
unknown reasons, the US suddenly changed its position and withdrew support from
Mubarak.
Wednesday, February 2, 2011, day nine of the uprising, after Mubarak’s speech,
many left Tahrir Square, thinking that their goals were met. Around noon, thousands of
Mubarak supporters entered the square, holding weapons and pro-Mubarak signs. At the
same time, in what has been described as a medieval scene, a great number of hired thugs
on horses and camels attacked the square wielding knives, swords, and whips. The
infamous Battle of The Camel, between Mubarak supporters and hired thugs on one side
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and the protestors on the other, lasted until early morning hours on Thursday
when the anti-Mubarak dissidents successfully expelled the attackers from the
square. During the battle, Molotov cocktails and live ammunition were used
against the protestors, resulting in a number of deaths ranging from eleven
(according to Egypt’s Ministry of Health) to 150 (based on the international news
agencies’ estimates). The Muslim Brotherhood had the biggest role in defending
the square during The Battle of The Camel. On the bright side, internet services
were partially restored on that day.
On Thursday, February 3, day ten of the uprising, Tahrir Square was
completely secured by the demonstrators, and they set-up checkpoints to make
sure that no thugs with weapons or civilian-clothed police were able to enter the
square. In a fit of excitement, a group of demonstrators attempted to storm the
Ministry of Interior building. They were shot by snipers, perched on top of the
building, who shot to kill rather than injure because most of the protestors were
shot in the head and neck areas.
Social media activists announced a million-man march on Friday,
February 4, the eleventh day of the uprising, which they dubbed Departure Friday.
More than a million persons attended the march in the square on that day.
However, the event was not politically charged. Instead, the atmosphere was
festive, with singing and dancing, street vendors, make-shift stages set-up
throughout the square, and different public figures giving speeches. On Saturday,
day twelve of the uprising, the state TV, in an obvious character assassination
attempt, claimed that the protestors in Tahrir are controlled by foreign powers. A
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gas pipe that supplies Israel with Egyptian gas was blown up that day, and the regimecontrolled media started speaking of terrorism. On the bright side, leaders of the NDP,
including Mubarak’s son, resigned.
On Sunday, February 6, day twelve, for the first time in memory, a mass was held
in Tahrir Square, and both Christians and Muslims attended it. Banks reopened for the
first time since the uprising started, and traffic police started to reappear on certain
streets. On Monday, February 7, day thirteen, in a move that showed how out of touch the
government was, Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik announced a fifteen percent increase in
all government employees’ wages in a failed attempt at calming protestors, who
dismissed the announcement. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptians continued to camp in
Tahrir, unwilling to leave before Mubarak resigned. On Tuesday, February 8, day fifteen
of the uprising, protestors moved towards the parliament building, forcing the
government to hold its meetings in an undisclosed location. This led the Vice President,
Omar Suleiman, to announce that the government will not tolerate any disruption of life
in Egypt, in effect, threatening possible harsher repressive actions against protestors.
Labor unions joined the protests on Wednesday, February 9, which was day
sixteen. At the same time, the government announced the freezing of assets of three
former ministers and banned them from travel in an attempt to appease the protestors.
Also, the Muslim Brotherhood announced that they would not have a candidate running
for the presidency if Mubarak resigned, as a peace offering to their fellow protestors. The
Brotherhood wanted to reassure the dissenters that they will not hijack the uprising.
While protestors in Tahrir were relatively safe, many were killed in protests in the
Elwadi El-Gedeed governorate on Thursday, February 10, the seventeenth day of the
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movement. The news of their deaths caused great anger among Tahrir protestors.
The army announced that Mubarak would give a speech that “will delight the
people” shortly that day. However, in defiance of the army’s announcement,
Mubarak gave a speech announcing that he would stay in office until the
September 2011 elections. This speech caused great anger among the protestors in
Tahrir. They called for a march towards the Presidential Palace. About 3,000
protestors marched towards the palace that night. The next day, eighteen days
after the protests in Tahrir began, Vice President Suleiman announced that
Mubarak had resigned as President and handed power over to the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on Friday, February 11, 2011, at 4 pm.
Finally, the protestors achieved their stated goal.
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APPENDIX E. DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS OF THE MODEL PRESENTED IN
TABLE 2 (N= 1,033)

Networks
Face-to-face networks
On-line political networks
Organizational involvement
Biographical availability
a
Female
Age
Age squared
Married
Unemployed
Class controls
High incomeb
b

Missing income

c

College graduate

Political interest controls
Political interest
Religion
d
Coptic Christian
Regional controls
e
Cairo Province
Urbanf
Constant

Equation 1

Equation 2

Street-protest
vs. no protest

On-line activism
vs. no protest

b
SE

b
SE

Equation 3
Street-protest
& on-line activism
vs. no protest
b
SE

2.522 **
0.363
0.098
0.431
0.451
0.476

1.676 **
0.527
2.476 **
0.577
0.432
0.608

15.953 **
0.410
1.483 †
0.762
1.606 *
0.635

-1.397 **
0.334
0.186 *
0.086
-0.002 *
0.001
-0.709
0.487
-0.344
0.653

-0.986 *
0.485
-0.104
0.116
0.001
0.001
-0.008
0.755
-0.288
0.711

-0.886
0.639
0.192
0.214
-0.003
0.003
-1.731 *
0.804
-0.728
0.966

-0.495
1.346
0.254
0.397
0.449
0.380

1.349 †
0.787
0.396
0.744
1.525 **
0.411

1.335
0.820
-1.377 †
0.737
0.798
0.567

0.311
0.324

-0.081
0.459

1.352 *
0.568

-0.955
0.694

-0.121
1.162

0.101
0.840

0.556
0.338
-0.105
0.321
-6.529 **
1.533

0.022
0.524
-0.782
0.551
-2.197
2.225

1.588 *
0.674
-0.119
0.696
-22.283 **
3.905

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category low income; c reference category
no college degree; d reference category Muslim; e reference category other provinces; f
reference category rural; † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
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APPENDIX F. MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PROTEST ON
ONLINE AND ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AND CONTROLS FOR
RESPONDENTS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF FACE-TO-FACE NETWORKS (N=313)
Equation 1
Street-protest
vs. no protest
b
SE
Networks
On-line political networks
Organizational involvement
Biographical availability
a
Female
Age
Age squared
Married
Unemployed
Class controls
High incomeb
Missing incomeb
College graduatec
Political interest controls
Political interest
Religion
d
Coptic Christian
Regional controls
e
Cairo Province
f

Urban

Constant

Equation 2
On-line activism
vs. no protest
b
SE

Equation 3
Street-protest
& on-line activism
b
SE

0.422
0.442
0.510
0.458

2.446 **
0.673
0.426
0.703

1.591 *
0.769
1.609 *
0.627

-1.440 **
0.369
0.154
0.097
-0.002 †
0.001
-0.305
0.526
0.198
0.715

-0.912 †
0.545
0.005
0.147
0.000
0.002
-0.573
0.891
0.210
0.832

-0.819
0.629
0.192
0.211
-0.003
0.003
-1.645 *
0.782
-0.456
0.989

-0.384
1.282
0.438
0.451
-0.019
0.401

1.415 †
0.769
0.032
0.882
1.155 **
0.437

1.326 †
0.795
-1.410 †
0.733
0.623
0.560

0.274
0.357

-0.460
0.558

1.237 *
0.566

-0.686
0.811

0.688
1.174

0.268
0.850

0.323
0.359
0.044
0.373
-3.807 *
1.802

-0.243
0.599
-0.621
0.622
-2.237
2.881

1.460 *
0.671
-0.068
0.691
-6.418
3.950

Notes: a reference category male; b reference category low income; c reference category
no college degree; d reference category Muslim; e reference category other provinces; f
reference category rural; † p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed)
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